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Ethics or Procedure? A Discovery-Based Approach
to Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees
of a Corporate Adversary
John E. bk
John D. Goetz *
I. INTRODUCTION
May an attorney involved in litigation against a corporation
ethically interview a former employee of the corporation without
the knowledge or permission of the corporation's counsel? The
potential benefits-and significant dangers-of such interviews are
immediately apparent.
The following example illustrates the issue. After working
fourteen years as an engineer at National Motors Corporation,
John Jones leaves. During his employment, Jones worked as an
engineer in National's design department and metallurgy laborato-
ry. His duties included designing and testing the suspension and
"crashworthiness" of a four-wheel drive vehicle that later becomes
the subject of nationwide product liability litigation. After leaving
the -company, Jones opens a consulting business and offers to sell
his experience to plaintiff's lawyers with cases against National. He
suggests that there are defects in the suspension system, and pos-
sesses copies of National documents that allegedly support this
claim. Jones knows the safety features, alternative suspension de-
signs, and safety test results for the vehicle. May plaintiff's counsel
informally contact Jones?' Although most cases do not present
facts as dramatic as these, courts and ethics committees have
reached confusing and inconsistent answers to similar questions.
* John E. lole and John D. Goetz are members of the Bar of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania and are litigation attorneys in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office of Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue. The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors.
I A similar scenario actually occurred with one of American Motors Corporation's
("AMC") engineers, who also received a law degree while working for AMC. AMC ob-
tained an injunction barring the engineer from discussing with plaintiffs' counsel any as-
pects of his AMC work that might involve trade secrets, confidential information, attor-
ney-client privileged information, or attorney work product. See American Motors Corp. v.
Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1991); Amy Singer, The Privilege is Ours, AM. LAW.,
Dec. 1991, at 40.
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This Article first explores the ethics standards and key court
and ethics decisions addressing the propriety of ex parte contacts
with former employees of a corporate adversary.2 In particular, it
analyzes the recent American Bar Association ethics opinion, For-
mal Opinion 91-359,' which concludes that such contacts are not
ethically prohibited. This Article identifies ex parte contacts with
former employees as an issue meriting special attention in the
absence of regulation by an ethics standard.4 It concludes that the
2 By "ex parte contacts with former employees of a corporate adversary," this Article
refers to any communication between counsel for one party to a dispute (the "contacting
party") and a former employee of another, corporate party to the dispute (the "target
party"), when the communication relates to a matter in which the contacting party's at-
torney has been retained, and the contacting attorney has not received permission of the
target party. Although the target party's interests in litigation normally will be adverse to
the contacting party's, the interests need not actually be adverse for Model Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct 4.2 to apply because the Rule prohibits ex parte communication with
any other party represented by counsel. See infra Part II.
3 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991).
4 Most commentators who have written in this area have addressed the former
employee question only as a subsidiary of the larger issue of whether contacts with current
employees of a corporate adversary are proper. See, e.g., I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 436 (Supp. 1988) (Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 does not
address communications with former agents and employees, "and technically there should
be no bar, since former employees cannot bind the organization, and their statements
cannot be introduced as admissions of the organization."); Matthew D. Keenan & Jeffrey
A. Chanay, Ex Parte Communications by Counsel with Existing and Former Employees of Adverse
Part: An Analysis of the Issues, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Apr. 1989, at 35, 43 (with regard to for-
mer employees, courts should construe the ethics rules and attorney-client and work
product privileges "in a manner that permits informal discovery to the greatest extent
possible"); Samuel R. Miller & Angelo J. Calfo, Ex Parte Contact with Employees and Former
Employees of a Corporate Adversary: Is It Ethical?, 42 Bus. LAW. 1053, 1072-73 (1987) (argu-
ing that court authorization or opposing counsel's consent should be required to contact
a former employee who was "highly-placed" in the company or if the former employee's
actions "are precisely those sought to be imputed to the corporation"); George B. Wyeth,
Talking to the Other Side's Employees and Ex-Employees, LrrIG., Summer 1989, at 8. Indeed,
courts, ethics tribunals, and commentators continue to grapple with the permissible scope
of ex parte contacts with current employees of a corporate adversary. See, e.g., Felicia
Ruth Reid, Comment, Ethical Limitations on Investigation of Employment Discrimination Claims:
The Prohibition on Ex Parte Contact with a Defendant's Employees, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1243
(1991) (contending that Rule 4.2 should be amended to more clearly separate "alter
egos" of corporation (who may not be contacted ex parte), and "witnesses" (who may be
contacted informally)); Stephen M. Sinaiko, Note, Ex Parte Communication and the Corporate
Adversary, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456 (1991) (contending that Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d) (2) should be amended to remove the risk of evidentiary admissions through state-
ments made by corporate employees in an ex parte contact situation, and therefore that
greater informal access to corporate employees should be allowed); Theodore Sonde &
Gary S. Kaminsky, Wading Through the Waters of Conducting Ex Parte Interviews of Current
and Former Employees of a Corporate Adversary: A Litigator's Dilemma, C520 ALI-ABA 1053
(1990). The special interests involved in contacts with former employees, however, war-
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problems surrounding these contacts are, both in theory and prac-
tice, discovery problems rather than ethics problems.
The extensive litigation in the ex parte contact area, not all
of which can be attributed to the uncertainty over the governing
standards that existed before Formal Opinion 91-359, indicates a
fundamental clash between the interests of the contacting and
target parties.' Based on its examination of the decisional authori-
ty, this Article distills the underlying interests that animate the
parties' conduct. These interests bear directly on the parties' abili-
ty to prepare their cases and defenses. Indeed, these interests
often are incompatible and involve zero-sum propositions--one
party's realization of an interest means that the other is disap-
pointed.
Because of the parties' strongly held and antagonistic inter-
ests, this Article suggests that an absence of standards governing
ex parte contacts will lead to conflict and chaos. Accordingly, this
area should be governed by a rule or some other means of guid-
ing litigants. This Article concludes that an amendment to Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the best means of ad-
dressing the concerns accompanying ex parte contacts with former
employees.6
rant separate treatment. See infra note 6 and Part VI. Furthermore, in light of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Formal Opinion 91-359, a fresh perspective on this issue and its
ramifications for the discovery process is needed. See infra Part IIIA-B.
5 See infra Part VI.
6 Although the underlying thesis of this Article arguably extends beyond the rela-
tively modest sphere of cx parte contacts with former employees, there are good reasons
why former employees deserve separate treatment:
1. After the recent ABA opinion, ex parte contacts with former employees are
not governed by any rule of ethics or procedure. See infra Part I1IA.
2. Because former employees are not "party" to the litigation, discovery regard-
ing them is in some senses more restrictive (e.g., no interrogatories or requests
for admission, see FED. R. Civ. P. 33, 36), yet more open in other senses (eg.,
after ABA Formal Opinion 91-359, information can be gathered through inter-
views instead of depositions).
3. Corporations and organizations need to obtain the effective assistance of
counsel and to maintain the confidentiality of communications with former em-
ployees who are subject to the attorney-client privilege.
4. Former employees may be more susceptible to suggestion, influence, or abuse
by the contacting party than current employees.
5. Corporations cannot compel former employees to cooperate as readily as cur-
rent employees.
6. The information held by former employees is less likely to be known by oth-
ers at the corporation as information known by current employees.
7. Former employees may hold grudges against the corporation.
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II. THE RELEVANT ETHICS STANDARD UNDER MODEL
RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4.2
Historically, rules of ethics have prohibited attorneys from
contacting an adverse party without the consent of the party's
counsel.7 Under a broad reading of this ethical prohibition, ex
parte contacts with former employees of a corporate party have
been restricted because courts or ethics committees deemed such
employees to be included within the represented "party." Until
recently, Rule 4.2 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct was the starting point for the courts' or
ethics committees' analyses.' Rule 4.2 provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by
law to do so.'
8. The location of a former employee is less likely to be known by the corpora-
tion than that of a current employee.
9. Former employees have an interest in not being inconvenienced by unregulat-
ed ex parte contacts.
10. Former employees may not understand that they have a right to request that
the target party's attorney be present during a contacL
11. Former employees may not adequately understand the legal significance of
the facts.
7 HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 201-03 (1953); 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF
LEGAL STUDY 771 (2d ed. 1836) ("1 will never enter into any conversation with my
opponent's client, relative to his claim or defence, except with the consent and in the
presence of his counsel.").
8 The ABA House of Delegates adopted Rule 4.2 in August 1983.
9 MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983). Forty states and the
District of Columbia have adopted the Model Rules or their substantial equivalent: Ala-
bama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Law. Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3-4 (1990). Of
the states that have adopted the Model Rules, only a few have altered the ABA version
of Rule 4.2:
Louisiana and Oklahoma specifically prohibit using another individual to
bring about a prohibited communication.
Florida replaces "party" with "person" to avoid limiting the rule's applica-
tion to parties in litigation, and it deletes the reference to communications au-
thorized by law.
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Prior to the Model Rules, Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) (1) of the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility set forth an equivalent standard. The language of
DR 7-104(A) (1) is nearly identical to that of Rule 4.2:
During the course of his representation of a client a law-
yer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on
the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior
consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is autho-
New Mexico adds language to the rule to cover communications with em-
ployees of corporations.
Id. at 71:301.
The District of Columbia has adopted perhaps the most unique version of Rule' 4.2.
See D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1991) ("D.C. Rule 4.2"). D.C. Rule
4.2 first repeats substantially the same version of ABA Rule 4.2 in its subsection (a). D.C.
Rule 4.2 then codifies several additional paragraphs addressing the employees of an or-
ganization:
(b) During the course of representing a client, a lawyer may communicate about
the subject of the representation with a nonparty employee of the opposing
party without qbtaining the consent of that party's lawyer. However, prior to
communicating with any such nonparty employee, a lawyer must disclose to such
employee both the lawyer's identity and the fact that the lawyer represents a
party with a claim against the employee's employer.
(c) For purposes of this rule, the term "party" includes any person, including an
employee of a party organization, who has the authority to bind a party organi-
zation as to the representation to which the communication relates.
Id.
The official comment to D.C. Rule 4.2 makes clear that a lawyer may communicate
with employees of an organization who have authority to bind the organization with re-
spect to matters underlying the representation "if they do not also have authority to
make binding decisions regarding the representation itself." D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 4.2 cmt. (1991). Because former employees cannot make such binding
decisions, D.C. Rule 4.2 does not prohibit ex parte contacts with these individuals. Inter-
preting DR 7-104(A)(1), D.C. Rule 4.2's predecessor, the D.C. Bar similarly concluded
that the Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit ex parte contacts with former employees be-
cause these individuals cannot make such binding decisions. D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op.
No. 129 (1983) (interpreting DR 7-104(a)(1)). The Committee concluded that
DR 7-104(A)(1) requires consent of opposing counsel only for contacts with employees of
an opponent organization who have "authority to bind the organization with respect to
pending litigation." Id. However, two members dissented from the opinion, contending
that the Committee had read the Rule "too narrow[ly]." Id.
Ten states have not adopted Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules. Presumably, these states
have chosen to rely on the Model Code of Professional Responsibility standard in
DR 7-104(A)(1). Although discussions of the ethics standard in this Article focus primarily
on Model Rule 4.2, the analysis and conclusions are equally applicable to
DR 7-104(A) (1).
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rized by law to do so."
Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A) (1) are easily applied to individual
litigants because it is simple to identify represented "parties" who
are intended to be protected. Matters become less clear, however,
when the adverse party is a corporation because an organization
can only act through natural persons. Neither Rule 4.2 nor DR
7-104(A)(1) explicitly defines which natural persons. acting on
behalf of a corporation should be considered part of the repre-
sented corporate party. The official comment to Rule 4.2 attempts
to explain the Rule's application to a corporation:
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communica-
tions by a lawyer for one party concerning the matter in repre-
sentation [1] with persons having a managerial responsibility
on behalf of the organization, and with any other person
[2] whose act or omission in connection with that matter may
be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or crimi-
nal liability or [3] whose statement may constitute an admission
on the part of the organization."
The phrase "persons having a managerial responsibility on
behalf of the organization" appears to contemplate a present agent
or employee relationship with the target corporation at the time
of the contact. The phrase "any other person," however, seems to
extend protection to former employees, especially if their acts or
omissions could be imputed to the organization. Therefore, al-
though the comment is moderately helpful in defining Rule 4.2 as
it applies to current employees, it provides vague guidance with
respect to former employees. Until the ABA's formal opinion on
Rule 4.2, ex parte contacts with-former employees were regulated,
albeit imperfectly, both by Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A) (1).
These ethics rules, and the cases and ethics opinions decided
under them, gave parties indications of both proper and improper
contacts. The very presence of that body of law undoubtedly led
some parties to adjust their behavior so that conflicts did not
occur. The many reported cases and ethics opinions hopefully
represent a minority of instances in which the parties could not
reach an accord and needed a specific determination of how the
ethics rule applied to a case at hand. 2
10 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1980).
11 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 4.2 cmt. (1983).
12 See infra Part V.
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III. ABA FORMAL OPINION 91-359
A. Discussion of Formal Opinion 91-359,
On March 22, 1991, the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal
Opinion 91-359, which addressed "whether a lawyer representing a
client in a matter adverse to a corporate party that is represented
by another lawyer may, without the consent of the corporation's
lawyer, communicate about the subject of the representation with
an unrepresented former employee of the corporate party."1 3 In
a brief opinion, the Committee concluded that such contacts are
not prohibited by Rule 4.2. The Committee grounded its decision
simply on the fact that the Rule and its comment do not expressly
mention former employees.
1 4
With respect to organizations, the Committee stated that not
only does Rule 4.2 include corporations within the meaning of the
term "party," it also includes three categories of individuals who
are employees of a corporate party. The Committee opined that
by defining three categories of unrepresented employees with
whom communication is prohibited, the comment to Rule 4.2
"clearly implies that communication with all other employees on
'the matter in representation' is permissible without consent, sub-
ject only to such other rules and other law as may be applica-
ble.""5
With respect to former employees, the Committee acknowl-
edged that the concerns reflected in Rule 4.2 may survive the
termination of the employment relationship. It then cited court
decisions interpreting Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1) in various
13 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991)
[hereinafter Formal Op. 91-359], "reprinted in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
901:140 (1991).
14 The Committee first recognized that Rule 4.2 was formulated to preserve the
proper functioning of the legal system and to shield adverse parties from improper ap-
proaches by opposing-counsel. Id. at 901:141 ('The profession has traditionally considered
that the presumptively superior skills of the trained advocate should not be matched
against those of one not trained in the law."). See also Meat Price Investigators Ass'n v.
Iowa Beef Processors, 448 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D. Iowa 1977), affld, 572 F.2d 163 (8th Cir.
1978); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 (1980) ('The legal system
in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of legal advice or assistance
are represented by their own counsel.").
15 Formal Op. 91-359, supra note 13, at 901:142.
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ways.' 6 For example, the Committee referred to the decisions of
Niesig v. Team 7 and Wright v. Group Health Hospitalt8 as prece-
dents for the view that Rule 4.2 applies only to current employees,
not to former employees. The Committee also cited Polycast Tech-
nology Corp. v. Uniraya4 Inc., 9 which held that DR 7-104(A)(1)
does not bar contacts with former corporate employees unless the
employee possesses privileged information. On the other hand, the
Committee noted that some courts have held that Rule 4.2 re-
stricts20 or even prohibits ex parte contacts with former employ-
ees.2 1 Finally, the Committee reviewed commentators' suggestions
that ex parte contacts with former employees be restricted.22
16 Id. at 901:143.
17 545 N.Y.S.2d 153 (App. Div. 1989), modyfted, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990).
18 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984).
19 129 F.R.D. 621 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, No. 87 Civ. 3297, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15382
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1990).
20 Formal Op. 91-359, supra note 13, at 901:143; see In re Coordinated Pretrial Pro-
ceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981)
(noting that rationale of Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), with respect to
corporate attorney-client privilege, applies to former as well as current corporate employ-
ees), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982); Amarin Plastics v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D.
36, 41 (D. Mass. 1987) (recognizing possibility that communications between a former
employee and his former corporate employer's counsel may be privileged); Porter v. Arco
Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986) (barring ex parte contacts with
former employees who had "managerial responsibilities concerning the matter in litiga-
tion").
21 Formal Op. 91-359, supra note 13, at 901:143; see Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v.
Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990) (interpreting Rule 4.2
to cover all former employees).
22 Formal Op. 91-359, supra note 13, at 901:143. See Miller & Calfo, supra note 4, at
1072-73 (court authorization for ex parte contact with former employees should be re-
quired if employee was "highly placed" or if the individual's actions are those sought to
be imputed to the corporation); Louis A. Stahl, Ex Parte Interviews with Enterprise Employees:
A Post-Upjohn Analysis, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1181, 1227 (1987) (deeming all former
employees who are "identified with an enterprise," either for purposes of resolving disput-
ed issues or effective representation of the enterprise, to be a party representative for
discovery purposes).
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While recognizing that "persuasive policy arguments" can be
made for applying Rule 4.2 to former employees, 23 the Commit-
tee refused to extend the Rule beyond its literal meaning:
[T]he fact remains that the text of the Rule does not [cover
former employees] and the comment gives no basis for con-
cluding that such coverage was intended. Especially where, as
here, the effect of the Rule is to inhibit the acquisition of
information about one's case, this Committee is loathe, given
the text of Model Rule 4.2 and its Comment, to expand its
coverage to former employees by means of liberal interpreta-
tion .24
Accordingly, the Committee concluded that Rule 4.2 does not
prohibit counsel from communicating with an otherwise unrepre-
sented former employee of a target party without the consent of
the target's lawyer.
The Committee placed two limitations on its decision. First, it
cautioned that contacting attorneys must be careful not to induce
unrepresented former employees to disclose information protected
by the target's attorney-client privilege. Second, the Committee
warned that contacting lawyers must comply with Rule 4.3, which
requires a contacting attorney to disclose the identity of his client,
the fact that the target party may be adverse to the contacting
lawyer's client, and the nature of the contacting lawyer's role in
the matter.2 5
23 The Committee did not expressly list these policy arguments in its opinion. In-
stead, it implicitly acknowledged that former employees arguably warrant protection under
Rule 4.2 because their statements could constitute admissions by the corporation or be
imputed to the corporation for purposes of civil liability. Law. Man. Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 901:143 (1991). The Committee referred to three categories of former em-
ployees to whom this reasoning could apply: (1) former employees who, when employed,
had managerial responsibilities concerning the matter in litigation, id. (citing Porter v.
Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986)); (2) former employees who
are identified with an enterprise, either for purposes of resolving disputed issues or effec-
tive representation of the enterprise, id. (citing Stahl, supra note 22, at 1227); and
(3) former employees who were "highly placed" in the company (such as a former offi-
cer or director) or whose actions are precisely those sought to be imputed to the corpo-
ration, id. (citing Miller & Calfo, supra note 4, at 1072-73). The Committee implied 'that
the potential impact of these employees' statements on a corporate litigant support ex-
tending Rule 4.2's coverage to former employees.
24 Formal Op. 91-359, supra note 13, at 901:143-44.
25 Id. at 901:144 (citing Brown v. Peninsula Hosp. Ctr., 407 N.Y.S.2d 586 (App. Div.
1978)); see ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 908 (1966).
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B. Criticism of Formal Opinion 91-359
The ultimate effect of the ABA's formal opinion currently is
unclear. To begin with, the opinion is merely persuasive, and not
controlling, authority on how Rule 4.2 should be interpreted."
Various state bar associations and courts already have handed
down a patchwork of interpretations of DR 7-104(A)(1) and Rule
4.2 (or their state equivalents) with respect to former employees.
Nevertheless, although the issue is not yet settled, the ABA's opin-
ion has been given substantial weight by courts that have consid-
ered it.
2 7
It should be apparent from the preceding section that the
ABA Committee employed a shallow analysis in reaching its deci-
sion. While recognizing that there are substantial policy arguments
in favor of applying Rule 4.2 to former employees in some con-
texts, 28 the Committee quickly dismissed these arguments simply
because the Rule and its comment do not explicitly mention for-
mer employees. The Committee's wooden interpretation of Rule
4.2 will result in more questions than answers because of the sub-
stantial interests of the parties involved and the amount of litiga-
tion the Rule has caused. Indeed, the Committee itself recognized
26 This is because state courts usually claim inherent power, under their state con-
stitutions, to regulate the legal profession. See, e.g., In re Stephenson, 511 P.2d 136
(Alaska 1973); Taylor v. Hoboken Bd. of Educ., 455 A.2d 552 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.),
cert. denied, 470 A.2d 441 (NJ. 1983); State v. Cook, 525 P.2d 761 (Wash. 1974) (en
banc); Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1977). As the court stated in In re
Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 95 P.2d 113, 114 (Okla. 1939), "the very fact that
the Supreme Court was created by the Constitution gives it the right to regulate the mat-
ter of who shall be admitted to practice law . . . and also gives the right to regulate and
control the practice of law within its jurisdiction."
The inherent power to regulate the legal profession is generally held exclusively by
a state's highest court. Esch v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 1039 (Alaska 1978); Burns v.
Huffstetler, 433 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1983); Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 648 P.2d 1289 (Or.
1982); Laffey v. Court of Common Pleas, 468 A.2d 1084 (Pa. 1983); Hahn v. Boeing Co.,
621 P.2d 1263 (Wash. 1980); State ex reL Askin v. Dostert, 295 S.E.2d 271 (W. Va. 1982).
This power has in some states been delegated to bar associations or grievance commit-
tees, which adopt rules governing the conduct of lawyers. Simpson v. Alabama State Bar,
311 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 1975); Gipson v. Supreme Ct. of N.J., 416 F. Supp. 1129 (D.N.J.),
affd, 558 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1976); see Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 201:103
(1984). While bar association rulings usually are accorded great weight by the state
courts, they are viewed as advisory and not binding. See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 201:103 (1984) (citing cases). The courts retain power to approve or disap-
prove any rule adopted by the bar association. Id.; see Simpson; Gipson.
27 See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
28 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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that "the concerns reflected in the comment to Rule 4.2 may
survive the termination of the employment relationship."2
The Committee also dealt with ex parte contacts purely as an
issue of legal ethics. It considered only whether such contacts fall
within the scope of Rule 4.2. It gave scant attention to the discov-
ery setting in which such contacts occur or the discovery disputes
they have engendered. This seems odd, especially considering the
Committee's numerous references to cases and other authorities
interpreting Rule 4.2 in discovery settings. 
0
Finally, in reaching its decision, the Committee did not con-
sider the underlying interests of the contacting party, the target
party, or the former employee. The manner in which these inter-
ests ultimately should be accommodated is open to debate, yet it
seems obvious that these interests should have been an express
factor in the Committee's calculus.'
In light of the limitations of the ABA's formal opinion and
the above criticisms, the following section will analyze the manner
in which to fill the vacuum left in the opinion's wake.
IV. RECONCILIATION OF ETHICS WITH PROCEDURE
Prior to the ABA opinion, ex parte contacts with former em-
ployees were assumed to be governed by an ethics rule-Rule 4.2
(and formerly DR 7-104(A) (1)). Now that the ABA has declared
this assumption to be false, the legal profession must address the
question of how best to regulate this area. Two primary alterna-
tives exist: a rule of ethics or a rule of procedure. Each alternative
has its own apparent benefits.-2 On balance, however, the theo-
retical basis and practical applications for such a rule are more
soundly grounded in civil procedure than in ethics.
A rule for ex parte contacts would function best as a proce-
dural rule because the conduct to be governed is more a method
of discovery than an aspect of attorney behavior. In the ordinary
case of an ethics transgression, the primary questions are whether
29 Formal Op. 91-359, supra note 13, at 901:142.
30 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
31 See discussion of these interests infra Part VI.
32 The primary benefit of using an ethics rule is perhaps tradition-this area long
has been considered part of attorney ethics. See supra note 7. A rule of ethics also might
have an advantage in promoting or deterring conduct before it occurs. However, certain
discovery rules, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, also seek to
achieve such effects.
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an ethics violation has occurred and, if so, the censure to be ac-
corded to the transgressor. In contrast, questions of improper ex
parte contacts usually involve matters of litigation or discovery
strategy masquerading as ethics disputes. The parties almost exclu-
sively are contesting each other's right to obtain information or to
shield it from discovery. As discussed below, the interests affected
are fundamental to the discovery process. Accordingly, it is more
appropriate to govern these interests as a matter of discovery than
as a matter of ethics. Indeed, in several instances, courts have
expressly recognized that Rule 4.2 is an ethics rule that is not
meant to control discovery."
The foundation for applying Rule 4.2 to ex parte contacts no
longer exists after Formal Opinion 91-359. As the ABA opinion
held, Rule 4.2 applies only to "parties" represented by counsel,
and former employees are not part of the corporate "party."
' 4
Accordingly, the theoretical basis underlying Rule 4.2-an ethical
restraint on one attorney's ability to contact another attorney's
client ex parte-does not apply to former employees.
There are two practical reasons why a rule of procedure
should govern ex parte contacts: (1) it will be easier for courts to
interpret; and (2) it will be easier for attorneys to understand.
Because ex parte contacts are primarily a matter of discovery, to
classify the rule in the discovery section of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure will increase attorneys' familiarity with the rule
and its application in the discovery setting. A rule of federal civil
procedure also would apply uniformly in federal courts, removing
the choice of law determinations that federal courts confront
when applying rules of ethics. 5
33 In Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 82-83 (D.N.J. 1991), the
court expressly acknowledged that Rule 4.2 "is designed to protect the attorney-client
relationship, not to control the flow of information relevant to a lawsuit." See also id. at
82 ("It must be recalled that [Rule] 4.2 is an ethical rule, not a rule through which cor-
porate parties gain the ability to control the flow of information to opposing parties.").
34 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
35 Federal courts usually adopt and apply rules of ethics identical to the courts of
the state in which they sit. See, e.g., Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129
F.R.D. 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y.), aftid, No. 87 Civ. 3297, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15382 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 15, 1990). A federal court applying an ethics rule must sort out state court and
ethics committee opinions interpreting that rule, and decide how the rule should be
applied in federal courL In situations involving conduct in multiple jurisdictions, the
federal court also must decide which state's ethics rules to apply. Action Air Freight, Inc.
v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 769 F. Supp. 899, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1991) .(conducting choice of
law inquiry in ex parte contact setting), appeal dismissed, 961 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1992); see
also infra note 49.
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Procedural rules that govern discovery in analogous settings
already exist. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
protects the manner in which information can be acquired in the
similarly sensitive areas of discovery regarding testifying expert
witnesses,36  nontestifying experts, 37  and attorney work
product.' In these instances, the drafters of the federal rules rec-
ognized that the parties' competing interests in developing their
cases or defenses, and in discovering information held by their
opponents, required rules allowing discovery under controlled con-
ditions. This Article proposes that, in the same way, ex parte con-
tacts with former employees can and should be governed by
Rule 26.
Before the interests underlying the parties' conduct can be
understood, and before a rule governing ex parte contacts can be
proposed, it is necessary to explore the ways in which courts and
ethics committees have treated this area in the past.
36 Under Rule 26(b)(4) (A) (i), discovery of information on testifying experts is limit-
ed to four narrow topics, unless the court on motion permits broader discovery. It states:
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each per-
son whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state
the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
37 Under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), one can discover information regarding a nontestifying
expert only upon a showing of "exceptional circumstances:"
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or'
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial,
only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
38 Under Rule 26(b)(3), attorney work product is shielded from discovery except
upon a showing of "substantial need." Even then, core work product is protected.
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things . . . prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, sure-
ty, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, bpinions, or legal theo-
ries of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
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V. SUMMARY OF DECISIONAL AUTHORITY
The propriety of ex parte contacts with former employees has
been vigorously litigated across the country, both in case law and
in ethics opinions of state and local bar associations. Together,
this body of authority has produced a jumbled mix of rulings and
interpretations of Rule 4.2 and its predecessor, DR 7-104(A) (1).
Three basic approaches can be discerned from existing au-
thority. First, a majority of courts and ethics panels have conclud-
ed that ex parte contacts with former employees do not violate
Rule 4.2 or DR 7-104(A) (1) because those rules do not expressly
apply. Other courts and panels have permitted such contacts in
certain circumstances, depending on the position the former em-
ployee held with the target company and the subjects broached by
the contacting party. These authorities have adopted various flexi-
ble approaches in attempting to resolve the issue. Finally, a small
body of authority has concluded that such contacts violate Rule
4.2 or DR 7-104(A) (1) and therefore are prohibited in all circum-
stances. This section will explain each of these approaches, and
then conclude with a discussion of cases that have attempted to
establish discovery standards for ex parte contacts.
A. Authority Allowing Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees
A significant number of courts and ethics panels have held
that Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A) (1) do not prohibit ex parte con-
tacts with former employees. Most of these rulings occurred when
counsel for the target party sought a protective order, disqualifica-
tion, or sanctions for the alleged unethical behavior of the con-
tacting counsel. In adopting a "bright line" rule, this body of au-
thority recognizes only two limitations on ex parte interviews:
(1) contacting counsel may not divulge or seek to divulge commu-
nications that are subject to the target's attorney-client privilege;39
39 See, e.g., Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 936 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1991) (text in
WESTLAW) (affirming district court's grant of protective order prohibiting plaintiff's
counsel from contacting former corporate employees who possessed privileged informa-
tion); Stabilus v. Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Greaves, No. CIV.A.91-6184, 1992 WL
68563 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1992) (defense counsel's interview of former vice president who
communicated with plaintiff's counsel during negotiations at issue violated Rule 4.2; court
ordered production of notes memorializing interview); MMR/Wallace Power & Indus.,
Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712 (D. Conn. 1991) (ex parte contact with former
employee required disqualification when employee, as member of contacting party's litiga-
tion team, disclosed confidential and privileged information); American Motors Corp. v.
Huffstuter, 575 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1991) (former employee-attorney enjoined from dis-
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and (2) contacting counsel may not interview former employees
ex parte if they are personally represented by counsel. Subject to
these limitations, contacting counsel may contact former employ-
ees unabashedly without prior notice to, or the consent of, the
target's counsel.
The most prominent case adopting a bright line rule is Wright
v. Group Health HospitaL In Wright, the court decided that only
employees with authority to speak for and bind the company are
part of the target corporation "party" for purposes of DR
7-104(A) (1).41 The court concluded that "[s]ince former employ-
ees cannot possibly speak for the corporation, we hold that CPR
DR 7-104(A) (1) does not apply to them."" In reaching its deci-
sion, the court stated that DR 7-104 was designed to: (1) protect
the proper functioning of the legal system; (2) shield the target
party from improper approaches; (3) protect the target party from
being taken advantage of by contacting counsel; (4) protect the
target corporation by shielding employees with the power to speak
for and bind it from unethical influences; and (5) prevent the
theft of clients.
43
The Wright court held that former employees do not warrant
protection under these categories and therefore refused to prohib-
it ex parte contacts. It noted that protectioni is not appropriate
merely "to protect a corporate party from the revelation of preju-
dicial facts."44 Issues of economy also favor such contacts because
closing trade secrets and other information subject to attorney-client privilege to plaintiffs
counsel).
40 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984).
41 Id. at 569; accord Shealy v. Laidlaw Bros., Inc., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1223, 1225 (D.S.C. 1984) (former employees are "obviously exempt" from DR 7-104); Tri-
ple A Mach. Shop, Inc. v. California, 261 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1989) (CALIFORNIA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr 2-100 unequivocally permits contacts with former em-
ployees); Nieseg v. Team 1, 545 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (App. Div. 1989) (DR 7-104 does not
preclude contacts with individuals no longer employed by corporation "and who therefore
cannot be considered parties to the present action"), modified on other grounds, 558 N.E.2d
1030 (N.Y. 1990); see United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. CIV.A.82-0192,' 1990 WL
39129, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1990) (court stated in dictum that a former employee is
not a "party" under Rule 4.2 or DR 7-104 because he lacks authority to bind the compa-
ny); cf. Mills Land & Water Co. v. Golden West Ref. Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 461 (CL App.
1986) (ex parte contact with former officer, but current director, violates California Rules
of Professional Conduct 7-103; court implies that if former officer was not a director,
contact would be permissible).
42 Wright, 691 P.2d at 569.
43 Id. at 567.
44 Id. at 569.
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of the expense of proceeding solely through formal discovery.
Other courts have reached similar results.45
Recent cases have also adopted a bright line rule in interpret-
ing Rule 4.2. In Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,46 the
court held that neither Rule 4.2 nor DR 7-104(A)(1) barred ex
parte communications with former employees. It reasoned that
nothing in the Rule or its comment justified departing from "the
traditional view" that the term "party" does not encompass former
employees. "Whatever the right of the corporation to 'barricade'
against ex parte contact those potential witnesses who are current
employees, former employees are outside the ramparts. " 47
45 In Oak Industries v. Zenith Industries, No. 86-C-4302, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985
(N.D. II. July 25, 1988), the court held that "[t]he plain meaning of the word 'party,' as
used in DR 7-104 and Model Rule 4.2, does not include persons who are no longer asso-
ciated with the employer at the time of the litigation." Id. at *6. The court reasoned that
to hold otherwise would unduly hinder contacting attorneys' ability to conduct informal
discovery, increase the costs of litigation, and possibly decrease the willingness of former
employees to provide information. Id. The fact that a former employee may have infor-
mation damaging to the target company "has nothing to do with the question of whether
the employee should be considered an alter ego of the employer." Id. In Siguel v. Trust-
ees of Tufts College, No. 88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1990), the court
determined that the contacting party's "substantial" need to gather information for its
case outweighed the target's desire to shield its former employees from ex parte contacts.
"DR 7-104(A)(1) simply does not apply in this context, because a former employee enjoys
no present, ongoing agency relationship with the corporate party that would make her
statements binding on the corporation under Rule 801(d) (2) (D)." Id. at *4 (citing FED.
R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D)); see also Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. 82-7 (1987). Interestingly, the court stated that it had announced "a
case-by-case balancing test without announcing a general rule." Sigue4 1990 WL 29199 at
*5. However, its order allowed plaintiff "to interview, without prior notice to or consent
from defendant's counsel, current and former employees who are not named as individu-
al defendants." Id. at *7.
In Bobele v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144, 147 (Ct. App. 1988), the court
held that DR 7-103 does not extend to former employees who are not members of the
target corporation's "control group." See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981) (definition of "control group"). The cost of formal discovery was an important
factor in the court's decision. "Not every witness' testimony is worth the price of a depo-
sition; in fact, many of the former employees which plaintiffs want to interview may not
be able to provide any relevant information at all." Bobefe 245 Cal. Rptr. at 148. The
court concluded that the "minimal risk" of privileged communications being disclosed did
not justify placing restrictions on ex parte contacts. Id.
46 129 F.R.D. 621 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, No. 87 Civ. 3297, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15382
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1990).
47 Id. at 628 (citations omitted). In Sherrod v. Furniture Center, 769 F. Supp. 1021
(W.D. Tenn. 1991), the court ruled that ex parte contacts with former employees do not
violate Rule 4.2 because the employees have no authority to bind the corporation by
their current deeds and statements. In reaching its holding, the court recognized the
need to protect less expensive, informal discovery of corporate witnesses. It determined
that the best resolution of the issue was to allow all parties "broad latitude" to investigate
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In Action Air Freight, Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp.,48 the target
contended that contacting counsel violated Rule 4.2 by engaging
in ex parte communications with'former managers of the target,
even though the managers were employed by the contacting party at
the time of the communication. The court disagreed. 9 It initially
stated that former employees lack an existing agency relationship
with the former employer and therefore cannot bind it. The court
noted that, for the same reason, a statement by a former employ-
ee may not be introduced as an admission of the target under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (2) (D)."°
The court then focused on whether the final category of Rule
4.2, relating to persons whose acts may be imputed to the target
corporation, applies to former employees. Recognizing that courts
have struggled with this prong of the Rule," the court concluded
that contacting counsel may inquire into the facts giving rise to
the dispute. Contacting counsel must refrain, however, from solicit-
ing information protected by the target's attorney-client relation-
ship.
The court offered three reasons for its ruling. First, it stated
that Rule 4.2's underlying policies do not justify the wholesale
exclusion of former employees from the discovery process and
should not necessarily chill the flow of harmful information.52
their case.
48 769 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Pa. 1991), appeal dismissed, 961 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1992).
49 In reaching its decision, the court first dealt with an interesting conflict of laws
question. Defense counsel, a member of the California bar, argued that he should be
bound by California's ethical guidelines, not Pennsylvania's. The court first noted that
California allowed rules of conduct followed by outside jurisdictions to supplement its
own rules. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 1-100. The court then ob-
served that the California counsel represented a client from Pennsylvania in an arbitra-
tion proceeding to be held in Pennsylvania. The court concluded: "Under these circum-
stances, we find that defense counsel practices in Pennsylvania within the meaning of
Rule 1-100. Accordingly, Pennsylvania's professional code governs counsel's conduct." Ac-
tion Air Freight, 769 F. Supp. at 902.
50 Action Air Freight, 769 F. Supp. at 903.
51 Compare Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258 (D.N.J. 1991) (allowing such
contacts with any former employee) and Curley v. Cumberland Farms, 134 F.R.D. 77
(D.N.J. 1991) (contacts allowed provided counsel avoids inquiries into information imput-
able to corporation) and University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 329 (E.D.
Pa. 1990), with Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd.,
745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.NJ. 1990) (Rule 4.2 prohibits all ex parte contacts with former
employees).
52 The court noted that "[tihe interest in preventing inadvertent disclosure of privi-
leged material does not justify a blanket ban on communication with the opposing
party's former employees." Action Air Freight, 769 F. Supp. at 903 (citing Polycast Technol-
ogy Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), afid, No. 87 Civ.
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Second, the court stated that the Standing Committee of the
American Bar Association probably intended the phrase "any other
person" in the official comment to apply to current agents and ser-
vants of the target. The court observed: "Preliminary drafts limited
the scope of a Rule 4.2 'party' to managerial employees. The ABA,
however, later expanded the definition to include lower level em-
ployees and agents involved in the transaction at issue.""
Finally, the court decided that the official comment reads
most consistently if the phrase "any other person whose act...
may be imputed to the corporation" imputes liability based on the
agency principle. Because former employees do not qualify as
agents of the target corporation, the court held, they do not fall
within the comment's imputation language. 4 Numerous other
courts, writing before ABA Formal Opinion 91-359, similarly adopt-
ed a bright line rule permitting ex parte contacts with former employee&'
3297, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15382 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1990)).
53 Action Air Freight, 769 F. Supp. at 904 (citing Hanntz, 766 F. Supp. at 264; Polycast
Technology Corp., 129 F.R.D. at 627-28).
54 Id. at 904. In reaching its decision, the Action Air Freight court relied heavily on
Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258 (D.NJ. 1991). In Hanntz, the court held that
Rule 4.2 permits counsel to contact ex parte former employees of a corporate target
subject to the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 265-69. Hanntz interpreted the purpose and
policies underlying Rule 4.2 to proscribe the type of questioning of former employees,
not the contact itself. Id. at 271.
In University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1990), the court
concluded that Rule 4.2 does not appear generally to encompass ex parte contacts with
former employees, but recognized that some courts prohibit such contacts if the employ-
ees held "confidential" positions or their conduct is the subject of the litigation in ques-
tion. Id. at 328 (citing Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 251-53 (D. Kan.
1988); Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D. Mass. 1987)).
The court noted that
[tihe underlying policy and Official Comment to the Rule make clear that it
was intended to forbid ex parte communications with all institutional employees
whose acts or omissions could bind or impute liability to the organization or
whose statements could be used as admissions against the organization, presum-
ably pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).
University Patents, 737 F.Supp. at 328.
55 For example, a trilogy of Delaware courts held in 1990 that such contacts are not
prohibited under Rule 4.2. The court in Diossi v. Edison, 583 A.2d 1"343 (Del. Super. Ct.
1990), decided the issue for the first time in Delaware. The Diossi court concluded that
the Rule relates only to present principals, officers, employees, agents, etc. of a represent-
ed entity. "Its clear purpose is to foster and protect the attorney-client relationship and
not to provide protection to a party in civil litigation nor to place a limit on discover-
able material." Id. at 1345. The Diossi holding was subsequently reaffirmed by two other
Delaware courts. Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 593 A.2d 1013, 1016
(Del. Super. CL. 1990) ("Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 does not prohibit contacts with
former employees since the former employees are not 'parties' to the litigation and can-
not bind their former employers."); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co.,
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Federal district courts that have considered ABA Formal Opin-
ion 91-359 largely have adopted it. In Shearson Lehman Bros. v.
Wasatch Bank,56 the court "join [ed] the ranks" of those who have
held that former employees do not fall within the scope of Rule
4.2. In relying on the conclusion of the ABA, the court held that
Rule 4.2 and its comment "act[] as a limitation on present corpo-
rate employees covered by the rule."5
7
Similarly, in Dubois v. Gradco System, Inc.,5" the court relied in
part on ABA Formal Opinion 91-359 in holding that Connecticut's
analogue to Rule 4.2 does not prohibit ex parte contacts with
former employees. The court reasoned that if the "other person"
language in the official comment was meant to refer to former
employees, then the drafters very easily could have made that ref-
erence explicit. The court noted that "there seems little doubt
that the drafters would have been explicit had they intended, as
defendants claim they did intend, to overturn the traditional view
that former employees are not encompassed within the term 'par-
ty.' '5 9 Most other courts that have considered ABA Formal Opin-
ion 91-359 have adopted it.6
No. 87C-SE-11, 1990 WL 161717 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 1990) (allowing former em-
ployees of a corporate adversary to be interviewed cx parte if the party's counsel identi-
fies himself or herself, advises that a controversy exists between the parties, and ensures
that the former employees are not represented by counsel). Other courts have handed
down similar holdings. See Fulton v. Lane, 829 P.2d 959, 960 (Okla. 1992) ("Because
former employees may not speak for or bind the corporation, ex parte communications
with former employees are not prohibited."); Amland Properties v. Alcoa, 711 F. Supp.
784 (D.N.J. 1989) (Rule 4.2 and its comment offer "no indication whatsoever" that the
Rule was intended to apply to former employees).
56 139 F.R.D. 412 (D. Utah 1991).
57 Id. at 417. In a preview to its holding in Wasatch Bank, the court ruled in Bouge
v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560 (D. Utah 1990), that the relevant Utah
ethics rules did not prohibit an attorney from communicating with low level current
employees of a corporate adversary. Citing DR 7-104(A)(1), the court reasoned that di-
rect communications were prohibited only with those currently -employed officials who
had legal power to bind the corporation or who were responsible for implementing the
advice of the corporation's lawyer.
58 136 F.R.D. 341 (D. Conn. 1991).
59 Id. at 345. Another Connecticut court has adopted the reasoning of Dubois. In
Carrier Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., No. 35-23-83, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 326
(Conn. App. Ct. June 10, 1992), the court held that the target did not meet its burden
of showing good cause for a protective order restricting contacting counsel from conduct-
ing ex parte interviews of the target's former employees. Citing Dubois, the court ruled
that contacts with former employees are not prohibited under Rule 4.2. The court noted
that the "traditional view" is that former employees are not encompassed within the term
"party." Id. at *2.
60 Based on Formal Opinion 91-359, the court in In re Domestic Air Transportation
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Based on reasoning identical to that relied on by the court
decisions, many state ethics panels have concluded that Rule 4.2
and DR 7-104(A) (1) do not prohibit ex parte contacts with former
corporate employees. The state bar associations of Alaska, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, and Virginia have ruled that such contacts are
not prohibited, regardless of the position the individual formerly
held with the target corporation.61 Various city and county bar
Litigation, 141 F.R.D. 556, 561 (N.D. Ga. 1992), held that "Rule 4.2 does not prohibit
communications with former employees of a defendant corporation as long as the former
employees are not in fact represented by the corporation's attorney." In Aamco Transmis-
sions, Inc. v. Marino, Nos. 88-5522, 88-6197, 1991 WL 193502 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1991),
the court relied on a Pennsylvania Bar Association formal ethics opinion and ABA For-
mal Opinion 91-359 in holding that Rule 4.2 permits an attorney to communicate ex
parte with any former employee, provided that certain conditions are followed. See infra
notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
The court in In re Environmental Insurance Declaratory Judgment Actions, 600 A.2d
165 (N.J. Super. 1991), also cited ABA Formal Opinion 91-359 in holding that it was
permissible under Rule 4.2 for attorneys and their investigators to contact former employ-
ees of an adversary, provided that they identified themselves and informed the employees
of the lawsuit. The court reasoned that Rule 4.2 applies only "to those who continue to
be employed by the organization who may have relevant knowledge important to the
case." Id. at 168. In concluding that the Rule was intended to preclude communications
with only those who could currently bind or admit liability for the represented entity, the
court emphasized the great value of informal interviews in the discovery process. It noted
that "[i]nterviews, as discovery tools, provide an attorney with the opportunity to infor-
mally contact adverse witnesses and other non-parties in an effort to discover the truth."
Id. at 170. The court in Neil S. Sullivan Associates, Inc. v. Medco, 607 A.2d 1386 (N.J.
Super. 1992), cited the In re Environmental decision and ABA Formal Opinion 91-359 as
persuasive in holding that contacting counsel was permitted to conduct an ex parte tele-
phone interview with a corporate target's former employee. The Sullivan court concluded
that these authorities "reflect the proper interpretation of [Rule] 4.2." Id. at 1389 (also
citing Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258 (D.NJ. 1991) (permitting ex parte con-
tacts with former employees)).
Finally, the court in Valassis v. Samelson, No. 91-CV-74029, 1992 WL 158720 (E.D.
Mich. July 2, 1992) relied on ABA Formal Opinion 91-359. In Valassis, the court ruled
that a former corporate employee is not a "party" to a lawsuit for purposes of Rule 4.2.
The court thus refused to enjoin contacting lawyers from communicating ex parte with a
corporate target's former controller, who at the time of suit worked for the contacting
party. The court reasoned that because the former employee was not an "agent" for the
target, she was not a "party" under Rule 4.2. The court concluded that if an individual is
not such an agent, then she cannot be a party because she "lacks any relevant connec-
tion to the organization which could reasonably place [her] in the role of the party." Id.
at *4. After considering ABA Formal Opinion 91-359, the court in Lang v. Superior
Court, 826 P.2d 1228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), decided to adopt a more narrow approach.
The court refused to adopt the ABA's per se rule because it concluded that such a rule
would not comply with Rule 4.2's prohibition of contacts with persons whose acts or
omissions in connection with the matter in litigation might be imputed to the target. See
infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
61 Ethics Comm. of the Alaska Bar Ass'n, Op. 88-3 (1988); Ethics Comm. of the
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associations have adopted the same approach.2 Just as with the
courts allowing ex parte contacts, these bar associations have rec-
ognized only two limitations: (1) the lawyer may not divulge or
seek to divulge information protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege; and (2) the lawyer may not contact the former employee ex
parte if he is represented by counsel.
B. Authority Adopting a Flexible Approach
Some courts and ethics panels have adopted a flexible ap-
proach to ex parte contacts with former employees. This approach
permits such contacts if the target cannot demonstrate that the
acts or omissions of the former employee will be imputed to the
organization.
The most frequently cited decision adopting a flexible ap-
proach is Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp.' In Amarin
Plastics, the court held that informal contact with former employ-
ees generally is permissible under DR 7-104(A) (1) absent a show-
ing that the acts or omissions of the former employee are imput-
able to the target." The court assumed that the "imputation"
language in the comment to DR 7-104(A) (1) applies to former
employees and noted that the target, in this case, did not meet
the required burden.5
Alaska Bar Ass'n, Op. 91-1 (1991) (reaffirming Ethics Op. 88-3); CAUFORNIA RULES OF
PROFFSSIONAL CONDUCr 2-100 (and drafter's notes regarding Paragraph (B))(1989); Colo-
rado Bar Ass'n, Revised Ethics Op. 69 (1987); Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 88-17
(1988); Professional Ethics Comm. of the Florida Bar Ass'n, Proposed Advisory Op. 88-14
(1988); Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. 85-12 (1985);
Comm. on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Op. 86-13 (1986); Ethics Comm. of
the Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 82-7 (1987); Ethics Comm. of the Massachusetts
Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 88-5 (1988) (reaffirming Formal Op. 82-7); Minnesota Lawyers Pro-
fessional Responsibility Bd., Op. 4 (1986); Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Virgin-
ia State Bar, Op. 533 (1983); Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Virginia State Bar,
Op. 905 (1987). But see Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Virginia State Bar, Op.
651 (1985) (improper for attorney to obtain information or documents from former em-
ployee by conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation").
62 See, e.g., Legal Ethics Comm. of the District of Columbia Bar, Op. 129 (1983);
Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Bar Ass'n of Nassau County, Op. 86-33 (1986);
Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Ass'n of the Bar of City of New York, Op. 80-46
(1982); Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Ass'n of the Bar, of City of New York, Op.
528 (1964).
63 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass. 1987).
64 In reaching its decision, the court relied on the Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 82-7 (1982), which held that DR 7-104(A)(1) "applies
only to present, not former, employees of the corporation." Amarin Plastics, 116 F.R.D at
39.
65 Amadn Plastics, 116 F.R.D. at 40. The Amarin Plastics court recognized that the
1992] -
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The court in Lang v. Superior Courft also adopted a flexible
approach. The court held that, generally speaking, counsel may
contact former employees of a corporate adversary ex parte. The
court stated, however, that counsel cannot contact a former em-
ployee ex parte if that employee's acts or omissions give rise to
the underlying litigation or if that employee has an ongoing rela-
tionship with the target in connection with the litigation.67 While
the court stated that "the better approach" under the rules of
ethics is to permit ex parte contacts,68 it refused to adopt a per
attorney-client privilege and work product exception further narrow the scope of permis-
sible ex parte contacts with former employees. Id. The court warned that if contacting
counsel seeks in any way to cause the former employee to divulge confidential
attorney-client communications or work product, "such conduct will constitute sufficiently
abusive conduct to impose discovery sanctions." Id. at 42. The court made clear, however,
that contacting counsel could freely question former employees about the facts sur-
rounding the dispute without implicating privilege concerns. Id. at 41.
Another court has indicated, albeit in dictum, that ex parte contacts with former
employees are generally permissible absent a showing that the acts or omissions of the
particular former employee are imputable to the corporation. Chancellor v. Boeing Co.,
678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988). The employees at issue, however, were present
employees.
66 826 P.2d 1228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
67 Id. at 1233. In reaching its holding, the court recognized that no Arizona case
had addressed this issue and no definitive ethics opinion had decided this question. Id.
at 1230. In fact, it recognized that Arizona ethics committees had issued conflicting opin-
ions on the issue. Id. It noted that in one alternative opinion, the Ethics Committee al-
lowed ex parte contacts with a former employee regardless of the employee's former
position in the organization and regardless of whether the employee's acts or omissions
were at issue in the litigation. Id. at 1232 (citing Arizona Comm. on the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Formal Op. 89-05, Alternative Op. (A) (1989)). By contrast, the same
Committee issued an alternative opinion prohibiting such contacts only if the employee's
acts or omissions could be imputed to the target for purposes of establishing liability, or
if the employee engaged in privileged communications with the target's counsel. Id. (cit-
ing Arizona Formal Op. 89-05, Alternative Op. (B)).
68 The court offered three reasons why it thought this approach to be better.
First, neither the rule nor its comments specifically mention former employees.
Had the rule been intended to cover former employees, it could have explicitly
said so. Second, the rule does not ban all ex parle contacts, but only those with
individuals listed in the comments. There is no reason to expand the scope of
the ban once the employment relationship ends. Third, we agree with the
Polycast Technology court that neither the threat of disclosure of confidential in-
formation nor the desire to protect the organization from liability-creating
statements justifies a blanket ban on ex porte communications. These concerns
are best dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Also, any movement away from infor-
mal discovery procedures will greatly increase the cost of litigation.
Id. at 1233 (citing Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, No. 87 Civ. 3297, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15382 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1990)); see also
supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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se rule "simply' because the individual is a former employee." 9 In
approving the distinction drawn in Amarin Plastid, the Lang court
reasoned that a per se rule "does not comply with the require-
ment of ER 4.2 of prohibiting ex parte contacts with persons whose
acts or omissions in connection with the matter may be imputed
to the organization."
70
After weighing the alternatives, a court in another recent case
applied a flexible approach as well. In Curley v. Cumberland Farms,
Inc.,71 the court held that Rule 4.2 did not under the circum-
stances preclude the target's eighty low-level former employees
from being contacted ex parte.72 The court reasoned that if the
target party could show that the former employees could impute
civil or criminal liability to the target, then Rule 4.2 might limit
such contacts. The court concluded that a possibility of imputation
was not enough.
73
The court grounded its holding on the dichotomy between
ethics and discovery, stating:
RPC 4.2 is designed to protect the attorney-client relationship,
not to control the flow of information relevant to a lawsuit.
The courts cannot permit ethical rules to be used by a party to
chill the flow of potentially harmful information to opposing
counsel where the danger of an ethical violation is minute.74
The court recognized that barring such contacts based on a hypo-
thetical possibility of harm to a corporate party would cause the
"already substantial costs of litigation to skyrocket and would result
in an enormous expenditure of time not mandated by the ethical
rule contained in [Rule] 4.2. " " To protect the interests of the
69 Lang v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). '
70 Id. As an example, the court noted that if an employee truck driver -is involved
in an accident during the course and scope of his employment, the fact that the employ-
ce subsequently leaves his employment should not determine the propriety of ex parte
communications. Id. "Clearly, the employee's acts or omissions in connection with any
litigation that arises out of the accident can be imputed to the former employer for
purposes of civil liability. Obviously, the former employer's lawyer should be given the
opportunity to consent to an ex parte contact with that employee." Id.
71 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.j. 1991).
72 Id. at 82. In so holding, the court refused to follow an opinion in the same dis-
trict that prohibited all contacts with former employees of a corporate party. Public Servs.
Elec. & Gas v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., 745 F. Supp. 1037 -(D.N.J. 1990); see
infra Part VC.
73 Curlky, 134 F.R.D. at 82.
74 Id. at 82-83 (citing University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 326
(E.D. Pa. 1990); Frey v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 34 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 567 (Wash: 1984)).
75 Curky, 134 F.R.D. at 82. In reaching its result, the court was especially interested
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target, however, the court approved certain guidelines for ex parte
contacts with former employees.
76
The court in PPG Industries, Inc. v. BASF Corp.77 also em-
ployed a balancing approach that provided some protection for
the target. In PPG Industries, an employee who was instrumental in
developing a trade secret for PPG left that company to join a
competitor, BASF. In subsequent trade secret litigation, PPG con-
tended that BASF's contact with the "crossover" employee violated
Rule 4.2. The court held, however, that BASF's interest in commu-
nicating with its current employee was stronger than PPG's interest
in protecting communications with its former employee. 7 The
court did not want to restrict BASF's right to conduct informal
discovery because PPG's interest in protecting its trade secret did
not outweigh BASF's interest in defending itself, especially where
PPG admitted that the secret already had been lost to BASF.79
The court further opined that the former employee's state-
ments were not binding on PPG so as to come within Rule 4.2's
in saving the parties "the considerable time and expense of perhaps 80 discovery deposi-
tions, many of which may be of little or no usefulness to either side." Id. at 95.
76 Id. at 94. For example, the court required the contacting counsel to log efforts to
contact former employees by date, time, effort undertaken, result, and person sought or
contacted. Additionally, the contacting counsel had to determine whether the individual
contacted was represented by counsel, had to maintain notes of such contacts detailing
the facts obtained, and had to memorialize any statements in their entirety. Id. Upon re-
quest, the contacting counsel had to provide the target with the log entries, counsel
notes, and witness statements. Id. Moreover, the court stated that "[p]laintiffs' counsel
shall seasonably supplement these items as they accrue, and shall serve copies of same
with respect to each month's activities not later than the 7th day of the month following
such contact." Id. at 94. The court concluded that these procedures would adequately
inform the target of the contacting party's informal discovery efforts. Id. at 95. For a
more detailed discussion of the Curley court's guidelines for ex parte contacts, see infra
Part VD.
77 134 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1990).
78 PPG Industres, 134 F.R.D. at 123. For another case involving a "crossover" employ-
ee situation, see Valassis v. Samelson, No. 91-CV-74029, 1992 WL 158720 (E.D. Mich. July
2, 1991) (holding that Rule 4.2 does not prohibit lawyer from communicating ex parte
with target's former controller, who worked for contacting party, regarding non-privileged
information); see supra note 60.
79 The court recognized PPG's strong interest in protecting the confidentiality of
communications between the former employee and PPG's counsel that took place before
the employee joined BASF. To guard PPG's interest, the court required counsel for BASF
to provide the former employee with a copy of the court's opinion and instruct him to
read it prior to any informal meeting between counsel and the former employee. PPG
Industries, 134 F.R.D. at 123. The court further required counsel for BASF to advise the
employee that he could not disclose any communications between PPG's counsel and
himself. The court permitted BASF's counsel to question the employee about facts, but
not privileged communications with PPG's counsel. Id. at 123-24.
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comment because Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (2) (D) applies
only to statements made during the existence of the employment
relationship. 0 While it recognized that a former employee's past
acts could be imputed to the corporate employer under certain
circumstances," the court determined that the case at hand did
not present this possibility.
In Porter v. Arco Metals,2 the court interpreted the word "par-
ty" to encompass only those employees who have legal authority to
bind the corporation in 'an evidentiary sense, that is, those em-
ployees who have "speaking authority" for the corporation.' The
court held that ex parte contacts were permissible so long as the
plaintiff did not inquire into privileged areas of communication
and did not interview present or former employees with "manage-
rial responsibilities concerning the matter in litigation."84
Several state ethics committees have adopted flexible ap-
proaches to determine whether ex parte contacts with former
employees are permissible. For example, the Pennsylvania Bar
Association's Committee on Legal Ethics recognized that an orga-
80 Id. at 121. The court overlooked statements originally made during employment
that were repeated or revealed after employment ceased. Arguably, one could treat such
statements as admissions because the individual was an employee when he made the
statements originally. The comment to Rule 4.2, however, may not encompass this scenar-
io because it speaks in terms of a present ability to make admissions. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 4.2 cmt. (1983).
81 The court cited the following example: Plaintiff sues corporation X for wrongful
discharge, alleging that Y, a former supervisory employee of corporation , actually did
the firing. Even though Y is no longer an employee of corporation X "it is his act
which may be imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability." PPG Industries, 134
F.R.D. at 121. Given these circumstances, the court would extend the prohibition against
ex parte communications to individual Y. Id. at 121.
82 642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986).
83 Id at 1118. In reaching this decision, the court was influenced by Wright v.
Group Health Hospital, 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984).
84 Porter, 642 F. Supp. at 1118. In Erickson v. Winthrop Laboratories, 592 A.2d 33,
36 (N.J. Super. CL Law Div. 1991), the court similarly held that ex parte contacts with
former employees were improper under Rule 4.2 when, inter alia, the individual contacted
was in a managerial, directorial, or high level position in a corporation or when the
employee's act or omission, could be imputed to a defendant for civil or criminal liability.
The Erickson court refused to adopt a "bright line" approach prohibiting ex parte
contacts, stating that Rule 4.2 "was simply not drafted in such a manner." Id. at 36. How-
ever, the court did recognize the corporate adversary's interest in shielding its former
managerial or directorial employees from informal discovery: "Plaintiffs' counsel shall de-
termine whether the person contacted was a manager, director or high-level employee
and, if so, shall terminate the contact before discussing the subject matter of this case
and shall release the name and address of said person to defendants." Id. The court
further stated that this protection "will serve to prevent any prejudice to the defendants
while allowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery in an efficient manner." Id.
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nization has a proprietary interest in controlling the testimony of
former employees, but deemed it less significant than an opposing
party's discovery rights.' The Committee concluded: "With ap-
propriate safeguards, the risk of overreaching by the investigating
party should be minimized, while at the same time protecting an
attorney's right to learn and assemble information off-the-record
without fear of facing disciplinary action or disqualification." 6
The Committee devised the following safeguards:
(1) the attorney (or anyone under her direction) is pro-
hibited from eliciting or using information that may be protect-
ed by the attorney-client privilege;
(2) the attorney immediately must disclose her capacity to
the former employee;
(3) if the person contacted requests that her personal
attorney or the company's attorney be present for the inter-
view, the request must be honored; and
(4) the attorney should advise such persons that they
have the right to refuse to be interviewed or, if they wish, to
be interviewed with the company's counsel present.87
Ethics committees in other states have adopted similar balanc-
ing approaches. For example, in Informal Ethics Opinion CI-597,
the State Bar of Michigan ruled that counsel can communicate
with a former employee when the employee is not represented by
counsel, and when there is no reasonable possibility to believe that
85 Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 90-142 (1990). The
Committee first reviewed the current standards for determining who is a "party" under
Rule 4.2. The standards include: (1) the "control group" test, most recently applied in
Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Service System, Inc., 471 N.E.2d 554 (Ill. Ct. App.
1984); see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-97 (1981) (definition of "con-
trol group"); (2) the "managing-speaking agent" test of Wright v. Group Health Hospital,
691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984); (3) the "scope of employment" test as illustrated in Morrison
v. Brandeis University, 125 F.R.D. 14, 17 (D. Mass. 1989); (4) the "interest balancing test"
also illustrated in Morrison; and (5) the approach adopted by the court in Niesig v. Team
I, 545 N.Y.S.2d 153 (App. Div. 1989), modifwed, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990). See generally
Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 90-142 (1990) at 5-9.
86 Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 90-142 (1990) at 12.
87 Id. at 12-13. The Committee concluded that when an attorney is in doubt about
whether she is authorized to pursue informal discovery of current or former employees,
she should seek the consent of opposing counsel or court approval prior to any contact.
One court, in applying the Pennsylvania Bar Association's opinion, denied a motion
in limine to exclude documents obtained informally from a former employee of a target.
Aamco Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino, Civ. A. Nos. 88-5522, 88-6197, 1991 WL 193502
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1991) (noting that the Pennsylvania Bar Association opinion permits
ex parte contacts with any former employee, provided that the contacting attorney follows
specified conditions).
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the employee's interest will conflict with the interest of the cli-
ent.' In reaching this result, the Committee balanced "the need
for proper ethical conduct against the efficient operation of the
adversary system."P Moreover, the West Virginia" and Wiscon-
sin9 state bar associations also have adopted balancing approach-
88 Michigan Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
CI-597 (1990). The Committee recommended that the lawyer advise the witness to seek
counsel if it becomes apparent that the interests of the witness and client may be ad-
verse. Id. at 1. Furthermore, the Committee stated that the interview should be ad-
journed until the witness has an opportunity to consult counsel. Id. at 3 ("All doubts on
this subject should be resolved in favor of non-communication unless otherwise autho-
rized by law or Court Order.").
89 Id. at 4. The Committee required contacting counsel, at the outset of the inter-
view with the former employee, to: (1) determine that the person is not a party to the
litigation; (2) ensure that the person is not represented by an attorney; (3) identify him-
self as an attorney for the adverse party in pending litigation involving a former corpo-
rate employer;, and (4) state the purpose of the communication to the person. Id.
In applying these guidelines, one court suppressed the work product of a contacting
attorney's investigators because the investigators failed to identify themselves before inter-
viewing the target's former employees. Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 768
F. Supp. 1186, 1196 (W.D. Mich. 1990); see also Valassis v. Samelson, No. 91-CV-74029,
1992 WL 158720 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 1992) (holding that Rule 4.2 does not prohibit law-
yer from communicating ex parte with corporate opponent's former controller regarding
non-privileged information); supra note 60.
90 ' The West Virginia State Bar concluded in Legal Ethics Inquiry 87-1 (1987) that
all directors, officers, and managing agents employed by the target at the time of the in-
cident that gave rise to the lawsuit are not subject to inquiry absent approval by the
target's attorney or as otherwise authorized by law. Id. However, the Committee stated
that former employees or directors, officers, and managing agents from other time peri-
ods are subject to such inquiry. Id.
Consistent with Legal Ethics Inquiry 87-1, the court in Dent v. Kaufman, 406 S.E.2d
68 (W. Va. 1991), defined the term "party" in Rule 4.2 "to include corporate employees
whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation (in
effect, the corporation's 'alter egos') or imputed to the corporation for purp6ses of its
liability, or employees implementing the advice of counsel." Id. at 72. The court held
that the Rule "would permit direct access to all other employees," including former em-
ployees. Id. (citing Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990)). The Dent court noted
that this test best balances the competing interests and incorporates the most desirable
elements of the other approaches. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that it is important
to remember that rule's of professional coniduct, not rules of evidence, are at issue and
rules of conduct do not protect corporate parties from the revelation of prejudicial facts.
Id. (citing Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984)).
91 In Ethics Opinion E-82-10, the State Bair of Wisconsin ruled that it is improper to
interview any officer or employee of a corporate adversary who has the authority to
"commit" the corporation. State Bar of Wisconsin, Ethics Op. E-82-10 (1982). However,
the Committee determined that a former managing officer may be interviewed as a pro-
spective witness if that individual has severed all ties with the corporation so that he
would not be a party by implication. Still, the Committee instructed that the contacting
attorney should first advise the former employee that he may have a continuing duty to
the target corporation not to reveal any confidential information that he may have ac-
quired during the course of his employment. Id. at 2.
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es for determining the propriety of ex parte contacts with former
employees.
C. Authority Prohibiting Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees
Only one court has ruled that ex parte contacts with former
employees are prohibited in all circumstances. In Public Service
Electric & Gas Co. v. Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services,
Ltd.," the district court reviewed a magistrate's decision that re-
quired the contacting counsel to give the target party two days
notice before he approached any of the target's former eniploy-
ees.9" The magistrate further required the contacting counsel to
send a warning letter to the employee delineating the nature of
the lawsuit and the purpose of the requested interview.'
The district court reversed the magistrate's decision and held
that Rule 4.2 prohibits all informal contacts with a target's former
employees.95 To reach its conclusion, the court relied on the
Rule's dual purpose: (1) to preserve the integrity of the lawyer-
client relationship; and (2) to prevent lawyers from extracting
damaging concessions from laymen.96 The court recognized the
difficulty of applying Rule 4.2 to a corporation, and instead fo-
cused on whether a former employee's act or omission may be im-
puted to the organization.9 7
Curiously, the court in Public Service Electric & Gas heavily
relied on the vacated decision of Sperber v. Washington Heights-West
Harlem-Inwood Mental Health Counsel9 In Sperber, the district court
held that the phrase "any other person" in the official comment
to Rule 4.2 "is plainly broad enough to cover certain former em-
The State Bar of Wisconsin supplemented Opinion E-82-10 with Opinion E-91-1. Al-
though the later opinion dealt with communications with an opposing party's present
agents or employees, a portion of it arguably applies to former employees as well. State
Bar of Wisconsin, Ethics Op. E-91-1 (1991). In relevant part, the Committee noted that
"[ilf the statements of these employees cannot constitute admissions on the part of the
organization, attorney A may communicate with these employees regarding the representa-
tion." Id. at 1.
92 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990).
93 Id. at 1038, 1043-44.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1042.
97 Id.
98 No. 82 Civ. 7428 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1983), vacated and withdrawn (Dec. 13, 1988);
see also Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988) ("When a for-
mer employee's acts or omissions in connection with the matter in representation may be
imputed to the corporation, then he or she may be a'party.'").
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ployees."' The Public Service Electric & Gas court agreed with the
Sperber court's interpretation and noted that the dispositive inquiry
is "whether, in this case, a former employee's acts or omissions
could be imputed, under any factual scenario, to the organiza-
tion." 1oo
The Public Service Electric & Gas court emphasized that the
harm caused by an imputable act is the same whether the witness
is a present or former employee. It stated that a change in em-
ployment status does not affect whether the act is imputable to
the target.'' The court further recognized the following para-
dox: One can determine whether an individual's acts or omissions
will be imputable to the target only after that individual has testi-
fied about those acts or omissions." 2 The court deemed. it un-
workable to require the target "to make a showing concerning an
individual's projected testimony prior to prohibiting ex parte con-
tact with the individual."
0 3
The court also rejected as unworkable 'the notion of allowing
ex parte contacts on the condition that the contacting attorney
cease questioning 'if it appeared that the former employees were
divulging imputable information. This, the court believed, would
spawn needless procedural litigation and place undue faith in the
contacting party.'" Therefore, the court held that the best reso-
lution was to make former employees off limits for ex parte con-
tacts. 05 By prohibiting contacts with former employees, the court
reconciled its decision with the dual policy goals of Rule 4.2. Spe-
cifically, the court nullified the opportunity for overreaching by
99 Sperber, slip op. at.3.
100 Public Serv. Elec. & Gas v. Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037,
1040 (D.N.J. 1990) (emphasis added). In concluding that this aspect of the comment is
"expansive," the court rejected the argument that the Rule does not apply to former
employees because they cannot bind or make admissions on behalf of their former em-
ployer. Id. The court noted that "Section Two applies in the far broader context of any
individual whose acts or omissions 'may' be imputed to the organization." Id. at 1041.
The court also rejected the argument that former employees are free parties because
they cannot make statements admissible against a former principal or employer under
hearsay rules exceptions. Id. "While it is true that a former employee witness cannot
testify clear of the hearsay rule on all aspects of his employment, this fact does not ipso
facto establish that his hearsay free testimony will not be imputed to the organization." Id.
101 Id. at 1042.
102 Id.
103 Id. Such a procedure would, according to the court, require the target to divulge
facts which would ordinarily be developed through the deposition process. Id
104 Id.
105 Id.
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the contacting party and also protected the target's interest in
knowing the acts, omissions, or transactions at issue. The court
then concluded that its approach would be easy to apply and
would give clear guidance to the bar."°
Attempting to diffuse potential criticism of its bright line
approach, the court down played the importance of informal in-
terviews and the hardship caused by requiring the contacting par-
ties to depose former employees. The court stated:
In the context of litigation involving an organization, the im-
portance of the informal interview is greatly exaggerated, par-
ticularly when its use threatens to produce needless and costly
procedural litigation. Today's result eliminates this hydra with-
out foreclosing [a] litigant's access to vital factual information.
Indeed, prompt use of the deposition process will ultimately
produce less procedural haggling and thus may be, in the long
run, more cost efficient." 7
Besides the Sperber opinion, which the court subsequently
withdrew, few other courts have indicated a willingness to shield
former employees from ex parte contacts under all circumstanc-
es.1
0 8
D. Authority Establishing Discovey Standards
Notwithstanding the numerous decisions in this area, the
tribunals only occasionally fashioned discovery procedures govern-
ing ex parte contacts and always did so on an ad hoc basis."°
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1043. In reaching its decision, the court therefore demonstrated a bias
toward the deposition process, considering it the "best method" for developing a factual
record and for protecting the rights of all parties equally. Id.
108 In American Protection Insurance Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Nos.
CV-LV-82-26-HDM, CV-LV-82-96-HDM (D. Nev. March 11, 1986), vacated and withdrawn,
(LEXIS Genfed. library, Dist. file), a former employee and consultant for MGM, who was
privy to confidential information surrounding the dispute, sought to become a consultant
for American Protection. The court disqualified American Protection's counsel for talking
to the former employee and held that former employees should not be permitted to sell
their allegiance to the highest bidder. Id. The fact that the former employee had initiat-
ed the contact with American Protection's counsel was immaterial. Id.; see also Kitchen v.
Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (assuming arguendo that plaintiffs'
attorney violated Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1) by communi-
cating with former employee of the defendant, disqualification not warranted because no
showing of prejudice); American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutier, 575 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio
1991) (reinstating an injunction barring a former engineer, who had received law degree
while working for company, from discussing confidential and privileged information re-
ceived during that employment).
109 See, e.g., Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 82-83 (D.NJ. 1991)
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Moreover, some courts and ethics committees articulated the inter-
ests to be protected during ex parte contacts, but then incom-
pletely described the steps by which the parties should achieve
that result.' Nevertheless, the cases that attempted to establish
ad hoc discovery standards are instructive for developing a rule for
all cases.
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. BASE Corp.,"' the, court endeavored
to provide safeguards against the potential problems surrounding
ex parte contacts. It required the contacting party to provide a
copy of the court's opinion to the former employee, instruct him
to read it, and further instruct him not to disclose any prior com-
munications he had with the target party's counsel." 2 Similarly,
in Oak Industries v. Zenith Industries,"' the court required the
contacting party to give its interview notes to the target party.
Other courts have required that the contacting attorney, at a mini-
mum: (1) identify himself and the capacity in which he has been
retained; (2) identify the litigation and the purpose of the contact;
(3) ask whether the interviewee is represented by counsel; and (4)
ask for permission from the target to inquire into issues raised in
the litigation."1
The most thorough effort to control discovery in a former
employee setting appeared in Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc."
6
(holding that Rule 4.2 is a rule of ethics, not a rule of procedure); Pennsylvania Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 90-142 (Dec. 7, 1990) (target party's propri-
etary interest in controlling former employee's testimony counterbalanced by contacting
party's discovery rights).
110 For example, a common exhortation by courts and ethics committees is that,
when interviewing a former employee in an ex parte situation, the contacting party
should refrain from inquiring into privileged information. See, e.g., Action Air Freight,
Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 769 F. Supp. 899, 904 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("[Contacting]
counsel may inquire into the underlying facts giving rise to the dispute but must refrain
from soliciting information protected by the [target's] attorney-client relationship.");
Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 42 (D. Mass. 1987); Porter v.
Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986);'Nassau County Bar Ass'n
Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 86-33 (1986); New York County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 528 (1964).
111 134 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1990).
112 Id. at 123-24.
113 No. 86-C-4302, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1988).
114 Id. at *6.
115 See, e.g., Siguel v. Tufts College, No. 88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199 (D. Mass. March
12, 1990); Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186 (W.D. Mich. 1990);
Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1989); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 593 A.2d 1013 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990); In re Environmental Ins. Declaratory
judgment Actions, 600 A.2d 165 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1991).
116 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J. 1991).
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In Curley, the court set forth the following requirements for con-
tacting the target party's former employees:
1. The contacting party was required to maintain a log of its
efforts to contact the former employees, including the identity
of the former employee sought or contacted, the date and time
of the attempted contact, the efforts undertaken to make the
contact, and the result of the efforts.
2. The contacting party was required to determine whether
the former employee was personally represented by legal coun-
sel and, if so, to terminate the contact and indicate this infor-
mation in the contact log.
3. The contacting party was required to make and maintain
notes reflecting the substance of the facts acquired from each
former employee contacted.
4. The contacting party was required to memorialize any
written or oral statement given by the former employee.
5. Within seven days of a request by the target party, the
contacting party was required to produce to the target party
the materials created under paragraphs (1) through (4) and to
continue to supplement these productions. The court expressly
did not require, however, the production of core work product,
such as tactics or impressions obtained through the contacts.
6. The court expressly reserved the parties' rights to depose
any former employee." 7
In setting forth these guidelines, the Curley court sought to
reconcile the contacting party's desire to inexpensively gain po-
tentially relevant information from a large pool of former employ-
ees (the location of whom were not always known by the target
party itself) with the target party's interest in protecting privileged
communications and in learning what the former employees re-
vealed to the contacting party."' The Curley court made great
117 Id. at 94-95 (adopting guidelines previously set forth by magistrate).
118 Several courts have found the Curley court's balancing of interests to be persua-
sive. In Erickson v. Winthrop Laboratories, 592 A.2d 33, 36 (NJ. Super. CL Law Div.
1991), the court adopted the Curley holding in ruling that Rule 4.2 prohibits ex parte
contacts with a former employee if the employee had a managerial, directorial, or
high-level position in the corporation; if employee's acts or omissions could be imputed
to the corporation; or if the employee's statements could constitute admissions of the
corporation. The court noted that "[t]hese protective measures will serve to prevent any
prejudice to the defendants while allowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery in an effi-
cient manner." Id. For a discussion of Curlo, see supra notes 71-76, and accompanying
texL
Similarly, in adopting a rule allowing ex parte contacts, the court in In re Environ-
mental Insurance Declaratory Judgment Actions, 600 A.2d 165, 168, 170 (NJ. Super. Law
Div. 1991), cited the Curley holding and its emphasis on discovery issues as persuasive.
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progress toward recognizing that ex parte contacts primarily impli-
cate discovery issues rather than ethics issues. After the relevant
interests of the parties in an ex parte contact situation are fully
identified, the Curry case can provide a basis for a new rule of
civil procedure to govern all cases.119
VI. UNDERLYING INTERESTS OF THE ACTORS IN AN
Ex PARTE CONTACT SITUATION
A simple interest classification scheme helps to explain the ex
parte contact litigation phenomenon that existed before ABA
Formal Opinion 91-359.120 By recognizing these interests, we may
fashion a discovery rule to prevent this phenomenon from contin-
uing in the opinion's wake. 121 The interests can be classified into
two primary groups: (1) the interests of the contacting party; and
(2) the interests of the target party. The interests of the former
employee also should be considered. 2'
Many of the contacting party's interests are analogous to the
target party's interests. For example, the contacting party's interest
The court emphasized that informal interviews had too high a value in the discovery pro-
cess and depositions cost too much to prohibit former employee contacts. Id. It conclud-
ed that "[a] rule that prevents opposing counsel from informally interviewing a possible
witness because the witness is considered a 'party' to the suit frustrates the search for
truth.'" Id. at 170 (quoting Jerome N. Krulewitch, Comment, Ex Parte Communication with
Corporate Parties: The Scope of the Limitations on Attony Communications with One of Adverse
Interest, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1274, 1278 (1988) (footnotes-omitted)).
119 See infra Part VII.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 39-108. Much litigation in the ex parte setting
likely resulted from Rule 4.2's lack of clarity and the different ways courts and ethics
committees applied the rule to former employees. Now that the ABA has "settled" this
issue, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991),
the amount of litigation surrounding this Rule will likely decrease. This Article hypothe-
sizes, however, that only a new discovery rule will effectively reduce the number and
intensity of disputes in this area. Even with such a rule, the focus of litigation might
shift to alternative methods for protecting former employees from discovery, such as joint
representation of targets and former employees, or target party retention of former em-
ployees as paid consultants.
121 Many similar interests are present in the context of ex parte contacts with current
employees. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 4, at 1253 (describing policies surrounding ex parte
contacts with current employees, with particular focus on employment discrimination con-
text); Sinaiko, supra note 4, at 1463-81 (discussing interests in favor of and against ex
parte contacts, and concluding that the need for truth and inexpensive access to evi-
dence require that ex parte contacts be allowed except for members of "corporate con-
trol group"). For the reasons listed supra note 6, ex parte contacts with former employ-
ees implicate special interests and deserve special consideration.
122 However, the former employee's interests should have a lesser impact on the
formulation of an ex parte contact rule. See infra Part VIC.
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in surprise, gained by secretly interviewing a former employee,
correlates with the target party's interest in learning the facts held
by that individual. Similarly, the contacting party's interest in ease
of access to information relates to the target party's interest in
burdening its opponent. Likewise, the contacting party's interests
in candor and breadth of information are linked to the target
party's interests in protecting privileged facts and withholding facts
from discovery.
A. Interests of the Contacting Party
Interests of the contacting party include both the interests of
the party represented by the contacting attorney as well as the
interests of the contacting attorney himself. These interests, howev-
er, always should be identical.
1. Interest in Candor
Arguably, the most compelling reason for allowing the con-
tacting party to have unfettered ex parte access to a former em-
ployee is that the contacting party will have an opportunity to
learn the facts known by the witness without the influence of the
witness's former employer. In most cases, a former employee will
talk more candidly about his former employer if a representative
of the former employer is not present. 23 This assumption is rea-
sonable for two related reasons. First, the mere presence of the
former employer at an interview with the contacting party likely
will chill the former employee's willingness to engage in frank
conversation, especially when the contacting party attempts to
123 See, e.g., Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 18 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating
that presence of opposing counsel tends to "inhibit the free and open discussion which
an attorney seeks to achieve at [ex parte] interviews"); Oak Indus. v. Zenith Indus., Civ.
No. 86-C-4302, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1988) (ex parte con-
tacts allowed in part to ensure that former employee would willingly provide informa-
tion); see also Siguel v. Trustees of Tufts College, No. 88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199, at *3
(D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1990) (ex parte contacts with current employees permitted in part be-
cause target party controlled information necessary to plaintiff's case); Bouge v. Smith's
Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 565 (D. Utah 1990) ("[W]itnesses may be more will-
ing to discuss a matter informally than in the adversarial context of formal discovery.");
Bruce v. Silber, Civ. A. No. 88-2588-H, 1989 WL 206452, at *2 (D. Mass. 1989) (informal
discovery methods especially important to contacting party where individual is attempting
to confront entire university); Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D.
502, 508 (N.D. Il. 1986) (ex parte contacts with former employee in Title VII action
permitted despite existence of termination agreement prohibiting such contacts because
contrary result would seriously impede contacting party's ability to discover all relevant
information).
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elicit information unfavorable to the target corporation. The for-
mer employee naturally might be reluctant to appear traitorous to
the former employer, or to impair his own image in the former
employer's eyes, by admitting to wrongdoing either not known or
imperfectly appreciated by the former employer.
Second, the target party might prepare the former employee
prior to the contact and might even suggest answers to the con-
tacting party's anticipated questions. The former employee might
agree with those answers, even though he would provide a more
complete or slightly diffeient answer if the target's attorney were
not present or did not prepare him for the interview.
2. Interest in Ease of Access to Information
An ex parte contact is an efficient means of gathering infor-
mation. Because ex parte contacts need not be orchestrated
through opposing counsel, they present far fewer potential obsta-
cles or expenses than contacts with opposing counsel present.
Merely as a matter of scheduling, the contacting party can
more easily arrange a meeting with the former employee when the
target party is not involved. Once involved, however, the target
party will have input as to the date and time of the contact, the
duration of the contact, the venue for the contact, and the fre-
quency of contacts.124 Furthermore, the target party might use its
participation in these procedural matters to influence the actual
substance of the contact. For example, the target party might
schedule the contact to occur only after the former employee is
thoroughly prepared by the target party's counsel, might attempt
to strictly limit the duration of the contact, or might arrange for
the contact to occur in a location that is geographically inconve-
nient (such as a city where the target's corporate headquarters
exist, but where the former employee does not live) or environ-
124 In an ex parte interview, the contacting party and the patience of the former em-
ployee determine the length of the interview and the breadth of topics covered. An
interview can last an entire day or several days, or can occur by telephone calls and
meetings several .times during the course of a case. See Sperber v. Washington Heights-
West Harlem-Inwood Mental Health Council, No. 82 Civ. 7428 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 21, 1983)
(contacting party interviewed former employee even though contacting party already had
deposed former employee for eight hours), vacated and withdrawn (Dec. 13, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). Limited only by its own zeal and the cooperation of
the former employee, the contacting party can inquire into broad-ranging topics that
have little or no relationship to the dispute between the parties, but nevertheless hold
interest for the contacting party.
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mentally inhospitable (such as target counsel's law firm) to the
contacting party.
A separate but related consideration is expense. 25 Ex parte
contacts ordinarily are informal and do not involve subpoenas for
testimony and documents, witness and mileage fees, court report-
ers, or process servers. Although these expenses are not normally
great when a single contact is considered, they can quickly add up
when multiplied by several former employees.
1 26
An ancillary expense is the potential litigation related to the
contact itself. Depositions sometimes result in motions to compel
testimony or documents, to quash subpoenas, or for protective
orders.
127
3. Interest in Surprise
Proponents of ex parte contacts do not tout the surprise fac-
tor, but it plays a far greater role than they publicly acknowledge.
125 The expense of formal discovery is one of the most frequently given reasons for
allowing ex parte contacts. See, e.g., Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 82
(D.NJ. 1991) ("To disallow ex parle contacts . . . would cause the already substantial costs
of litigation to skyrocket . . . ."). The courts, however, have reached different conclusions
as to the importance of this interest Compare Oak Indus., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6
(requiring target party's consent to ex parte contact would increase the costs of litiga-
tion) and Frey v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (for-
mal discovery might prejudice litigants with limited resources) and Shealy v. Laidlaw
Bros., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1223, 1224 (D.S.C. 1984) (time and expense sav-
ings justified ex parte contacts) and Bobele v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(Ct. App. 1988) (contacting party's interest in inexpensive and practical discovery from
former employees required ex parte contacts) with In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings
in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981) (insulation of
former employees from ex parte contacts results in inconvenience and frustration, but
this does not warrant "interference with the right to counsel"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990
(1982) and Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 745
F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (D.N.J. 1990) (increases in cost and time resulting from formal dis-
covery through depositions is not particularly onerous, and importance of informal discov-
ery is greatly exaggerated).
126 Bouge, 132 F.R.D. at 565 ("[I]t must be recognized that contemporary litigation is
costly and often the 'little guy,' plaintiff or defendant is at a distinct disadvantage in the
process."); Bobele, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (to require contacting party's counsel to pursue
formal discovery procedures for all former employees would make litigation too costly).
127 The attorney and court time related to litigation over depositions can take on
proportions equal to an entire case in itself. Cf Public Sem. Elec. & Gas Co., 745 F. Supp.
at 1043 (litigation regarding ex parte contacts would outstrip cost savings of using infor-
mal discovery over deposition process). At present, the expense of litigation attached to
formal discovery involving former employees is counterbalanced by the expense of litiga-
tion over the propriety of ex parte contacts. Hopefully, this Article will provide a frame-
work for resolving this problem by removing or minimizing this second aspect of litiga-
tion.
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Since the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
philosophy of the federal and many state discovery systems has
been to promote wide-ranging and open discovery.1 28 The discov-
ery rules purposely attempt to eliminate "trial by ambush.""2 Yet,
the American tradition of gamesmanship dies hard. Perhaps
spurred on by images traditionally evoked by "Perry Mason" and,
more recently, "Matlock," lawyers always delight in surprising their
opponents. The ex parte contact holds the promise of a hidden
document, an unknown witness, and the final piece of the puzzle
to spring on an unsuspecting adversary. 3 0
Surprise has legitimate and illegitimate facets. No impropriety
exists in capitalizing on surprise when it results from unequal trial
preparation. A party that works harder and better at preparing a
case deserves to benefit from that labor, even if it jeopardizes the
opposing party.3 1 But surprise can be illegitimate when a party
violates a duty to provide information, such as by failing to iden-
tify witnesses with knowledge of discoverable matters.3 2 Surprise
128 J. Milton Pollack, Discovery-ts Abuse And Correction, 80 F.R1D. 219, 220 (1978) ("A
new horizon was proclaimed [by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]. Civil litigation
would thenceforth be a search for the truth and this would best be served by a full
development of all the facts prior to the trial presentation.").
129 Id. ("In the days before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, trial by ambush
and secrecy was considered normal in the courts of law."); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 253 (1978) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure express con-
gressional judgment that "'trial by ambush,' ... well may disserve the cause of
truth . . . .") (citations omitted) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
130 Unbeknown to the target, the contacting party may learn about a former employ-
ee who has relevant or perhaps even crucial information regarding the case. The name
may surface in documents produced in discovery, in the course of consulting with the
contacting party's own witnesses, or the former employee may come forth on his own.
This risk is greatest in cases involving long lapses of time between the relevant events
and the time of suit, cases with many potential witnesses, and cases in which there is
uncertainty over the persons who possess relevant knowledge. Although, in theory, proce-
dural devices such as interrogatories, exchanges of witness lists, and final pretrial orders
prevent the occurrence of surprises, in practice they only temper the surprise. Conse-
quently, parties still seek out and exploit potentials for surprise, and the ex parte contact
situation is an ideal opportunity for the acquisition of knowledge that will lead to sur-
prise.
131 For example, if a party fails to request information in interrogatories, or fails to
discover information about a witness identified on a witness list, it does not reflect poorly
on the opponent who did not volunteer the information. Our adversary system-necessarily
assumes a parity of competence and diligence. As the Supreme Court stated in Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947): "Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the
adversary."
132 Rule 26(e)'s failure to create a general duty to supplement discovery responses,
while creating a special duty to supplement with respect to the identity of witnesses,
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also is illegitimate when it results from a suggestion to a nonclient
former employee that he refrain from providing information to
the target party. 33
4. Interest in Influencing the Facts
Like the interest in surprise, the interest in influencing the
facts is not readily acknowledged by proponents of ex parte con-
tacts. Yet, this interest nevertheless arises in all ex parte contact
situations.3 4 Like the interest in surprise, the interest in influ-
encing the facts has dimensions that are legitimate and illegiti-
mate.
As a result of our adversary system, each party has counsel
charged with the duty to vigorously champion his client's cause.
With few exceptions, every litigated case has as many viewpoints as
parties. Consequently, parties rarely agree on the fine distinction
between competing factual possibilities and the legal conclusions
to be drawn from them. In legal theory, facts are facts-something
either happened, or it did not. In legal practice, however, the
reconstruction of events depends on documents and, most impor-
tantly, the recollection of persons who observed or participated in
the events at issue.
illustrates the heightened importance of disclosing such information:
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement the response to include
information thereafter acquired, except as follows: (1) A party is under a duty
seasonably to supplement the response with respect to any question directly
addressed to (A) the identity and location of persons having knowledge of dis-
coverable matters ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)
133 Rule 3.4 forbids a lawyer from requesting "a person other than a client to refrain
from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party," with an exception in cer-
tain cases for relatives, employees and agents of a client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT RULE 3.4 (1983). This Rule is more extensively discussed in connection with
the interests of the target party. See infia note 148.
134 In Niesig v. Team I, 545 N.Y.S.2d 153 (App. Div. 1989), modified, 558 N.E.2d 1030
(N.Y. 1990), the court stated that the contacting party's desire for ex parte contacts was
not motivated by a quest for the truth, but in part by a desire to gain a tactical advan-
tage over the target party. The court observed that "the likelihood that a witness will, in
response to an improperly phrased or leading question, make an improvident response
prejudicial either to his employer or to himself is greater when that witness has no coun-
sel present." Niesig, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 160. See also Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d
564, 567 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (a purpose behind prohibition on ex parte interviews is
to prevent the contacting party's counsel from taking advantage of the target party);
Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Revised Op. 69 (1987) (even well-intended ex parte
contact can have coercive effect on unrepresented witness).
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The development of facts through discovery is never
content-neutral. A party always attempts to develop the record in a
light most favorable to its own position. Accordingly, in an ex
parte contact situation, the contacting attorney will attempt to
elicit facts most favorable to his client's position. Depending on
the approach of the contacting party and the clarity of the former
employee's recollection, this elicitation may occur through gentle
prompting or outright suggestion.
Because the former employee normally will not appreciate the
legally significant factual subtleties involved in a dispute, an ex
parte interview might result in a swaying of the former employee's
recollection in the contacting party's favor.135 Once a former em-
ployee forms a recollection cast in the contacting party's mold, he
might later persist in that recollection in the .face of seemingly
inconsistent facts. Moreover, after the contacting party elicits a
favorable recollection, the former employee might provide a writ-
ten or testimonial statement to which he will feel a strong pres-
sure to adhere.
5. Interest in Obtaining Privileged 'Information
Because the forbidden fruit is always sweetest, the contacting
party might have an unspoken and illegitimate interest in obtain-
ing confidential or privileged information from the former em-
ployee."3 6 Except in an unusual case, the former employee will
'not be qualified to distinguish between privileged and
nonprivileged communications related to the iatter in dispute. In-
stead, the former employee mentally will classify his knowledge by
subject matter without regard to the distinctions that privilege may
135 The potential for influence over recollection is most obvious when the ex parte
contact occurs many years after the events at issue, and when the former employee's
recollection is selectively refreshed only with information favorable to the contacting
party's position.
136 In American Protection Insurance Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Civ. Nos.
CV-LV-82-26-HDM, CV-LV-82-96-HDM (D. Nev. Mar. 11, 1986), vacated and withdraum,
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file), a former employee who was centrally involved with
the facts in litigation sought to become a consultant to the contacting party and to dis-
close privileged and confidential information. The court condemned the contacting
party's attempt to gain access to protected information in this way and disqualified coun-
sel for the contacting party. .See also American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d
116 (Ohio 1991) (former employee possessing privileged information hired himself out to
plaintiffs' attorneys suing former employer); Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp.,
116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass. 1987) (contacting party would be sanctioned if it sought to ob-
tain privileged or confidential information through ex parte contacts).
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create. Consequently, the former employee might unknowingly
reveal a privileged communication to the contacting party.
13 7
B. Interests of the Target Party
Just as with the contacting party's interests, the interests of
the target party include the interests of the target party's counsel.
1. Interest in Protecting Privileged Information from Disclosure
A central purpose of the ex parte contact rule is the interest
in protecting against the unwitting disclosure of privileged infor-
mation.' When a party is a corporation, privileged communica-
tions obviously must be made or received by individuals acting on
behalf of the corporation.'39 This in no way lessens the protec-
tion accorded to the corporation's privilege, but does make the
privilege more difficult to protect. When a former employee pos-
sesses privileged information, the termination of the employment
relationship has no impact on the privilege-the privilege remains
with the corporation and can be waived by the corporation
alone. 4 ° Accordingly, the corporation possesses a great interest
137 Although courts, ethics committees, and ABA Formal Opinion 91-359 attempt to
guard against such revelations by cautioning the contacting attorney, see supra text accom-
panying notes 25, 85-91, such measures might not provide significant protection. This is
because, in the course of discussing the subject matter involved in the case, the former
employee is likely to reveal privileged information unless he has been specifically advised
that such information is privileged and protected from disclosure.
138 See, e.g., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd.,
745 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990); Bobele v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct.
App. 1988) (target's interest in preventing disclosure of privileged information must be
weighed against contacting party's interest in inexpensive and convenient discovery; with
respect to former employees, contacting party's interests were greater); Stahl, supra note
22 (contending that the prohibition on ex parte contacts should be coextensive with the
attorney-client privilege); Krulewitch, supra note 118, at 1277, 1280-83.
139 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1981). In Upjohn, the Su-
preme Court held that communications made to or from corporate employees, when
made for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice, were protected by the
corporation's attorney-client privilege. Id. at 390. In so holding, the Court rejected the
argument that only communications with the "control group" of the corporation were
entitled to the privilege.
Although a substantial number of the communications involved in Upjohn were com-
munications to or from former employees, the Court did not reach the issue whether
such communications were entitled to privileged treatment. Id. at 394 n.3. This Article
focuses on persons who were employed at the time they became privy to the target's
protected information, but thereafter left the target's employ.
140 CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348-56 (1985) (implicitly holding that current
corporate management is authorized to waive corporation's privilege); Polycast Technology
Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (corporation controls its priv-
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in ensuring that former employees will not, through ex parte con-
tacts with contacting lawyers, reveal privileged information.1 41
With the target party's counsel present during any ex parte
contact, inadvertent disclosures of privileged matters are not likely
to occur. The target party's counsel ordinarily will have had an
opportunity to discuss issues of privilege with the former employee
prior to the contact. By doing so, the target party's counsel not
only can sensitize the former employee to the existence of the
attorney-client privilege, but target counsel can also learn what
privileged information the former employee possesses. By being
present during the contact itself, target counsel can alert the con-
tacting attorney and the former employee alike that privileged
areas are being broached, and can assert the target's privilege
when necessary.. Finally, if privileged matters are inadvertently
disclosed, the target party knows the nature and extent of the
disclosure so that it can prepare to protect itself from any damage
that could result.
2. Interest in Learning the Facts
A corporation embroiled in litigation necessarily will desire to
learn the relevant facts from the most knowledgeable persons. A
former employee might be the person with the best, or only, in-
formation regarding the matter at issue. A former employee also
might have a perspective, either because of length of tenure or
detachment from the fray, that current employees do not have. At
the very least, the target party will be interested in a former
employee's knowledge for the sheer reason that contacting counsel
desires to interview the former employee. Therefore, the target
party always will have an interest in learning what the former
employee knows.
Except in the case of a former employee who obviously has
knowledge relevant to the case, the target party always is at risk
that its opponent might locate a knowledgeable former employee
ilege), affid, No. 87 Civ. 3297, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15382 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1990).
141 The interest in protecting privileged information from disclosure is arguably more
important in a former employee context than otherwise. The former employee might feel
little or no loyalty to his former employer and might even knowingly divulge privileged
information. Furthermore, a former employee situation presents more potential for disclo-
sure of privileged information because a former employee might not have the same op.
portunity to consult with corporate management or counsel over the significance, confi-
dentiality, or discoverability of matters within the former employee's knowledge.
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whose knowledge the target does not appreciate. If the contacting
party interviews such a person, it may learn important information
about the target that the target does not know about itself. A
corollary to the target's interest in learning the facts thus is its
interest in avoiding surprise.
3. Interest in Ensuring the Accurate Description of Events
The target party has an interest in ensuring that its former
employees accurately describe the relevant events when contacted
by the contacting party." If the target party's counsel is not
present during (or does not even have notice of) the contact, the
target is open to the risk that the former employee will have inad-
equate firsthand information regarding an event, but nevertheless
will purport to describe it, or will have a faulty recollection of the
event. Faced with the contacting party's interest in influencing the
facts, the former employee might agree to a version of the facts
that is adverse to the target party, without appreciating the legal
difference that minor factual distinctions can make.
Once a former employee reveals or agrees with inaccurate or
slanted information, the target party will have extreme difficulty in
curing the damage. The target party either must convince the
former employee to recant 'or modify his description of events, or
must contradict the former employee's description based on docu-
ments or other witnesses. If the former employee's testimony is
crucial, the target party could be irreparably harmed at trial by at-
tacking its witness on some matters while relying on that testimony
for others.
If the target party is present during a contact, it can guard
against the former employee's providing information based on
hearsay, opinion, or outright speculation. The target party can
object to questions that call for this information, fall outside the
former employee's sphere of responsibility, or assume the exis-
tence of inaccurate or contested facts. The target party also nor-
mally will have had a previous opportunity to discuss the relevant
142 See New York Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-46 (1982) (ex parte inter-
views of corporate employees may undermine effective representation because employee
may make statements that do not accurately or fairly represent target's position; target's
interest in effective representation outweighs contacting party's interest in informal discov-
ery) (current employee); Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 86-13 (1986) (in order to
represent the target party, its counsel must be able to control the flow of information
from certain corporate employees, but this does not apply to former employees because
they cannot bind the corporation).
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facts with the former employee, and refresh his recollection based
on what other witnesses can recall or important documents de-
pict. 43
4. Interest in Influencing the Facts
As discussed in connection with the contacting party's com-
panion interest in influencing the facts, there never will be only
one side to a matter in litigation. Accordingly, a target party will
have an interest in seeing that its former employees depict the
facts in a light most favorable to the target party.144 Depending
on the degree to which the target party seeks to influence the
facts, this interest can be legitimate or illegitimate.
The target party might only advise the former employee of
legally significant distinctions between similar fact patterns and
allow the individual to choose the one he thinks best comports
with his recollection. The corporation might, however, already
have determined the position it will take and then seek to have
the former employee confirm this predetermined position. To
accomplish this, the target party might conduct interviews and
preparation sessions with the former employee and, with varying
degrees of suggestion and emphasis, mold his partially conflicting
or incomplete recollection into the target's otherwise solid de-
fense. 45 Furthermore, the target party's counsel may want to be
present during the contact to ensure that the former employee
maintains his story and is not influenced by the contacting attor-
ney to change it.
143 The target party has a corollary interest in learning the facts before its opponent.
Unlike an individual, a corporation is limited to its employees and other agents as sourc-
es of facts. An individual knows facts as they occur; a corporation must collect facts from
initial 'observers and compile them into a cohesive body of information. In this way, a
corporation can begin to understand and prepare its own case before its former employ-
ees are subjected to contacts by opponents. By learning the facts first, the target party
not only can prepare to defend against harmful facts, but also can avoid being surprised
by its adversary. Therefore, the interest in learning the facts first is related to the target
party's interest in both influencing the facts and in withholding facts from discovery. See
infr text accompanying notes 144-48.
144 Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 82-87 (1987) (target party's counsel must be
able to control flow of information to adversary and to present truthful statements in the
most effective manner) (current employee).
145 To best advance this interest, the target party must have an opportunity to discuss
the matters with the former employee before he is contacted by the opponent. In this
way, the target party's interest in influencing the facts dovetails with its interest in learn-
ing the facts first.
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5. Interest in Withholding Facts from Discovery
Except in cases of privilege or other legitimate protections
from discovery,14 6 withholding facts never will be a legitimate in-
terest. This interest is likely to be present, however, in almost
every case. The target party understandably will desire that its op-
ponent not learn facts harmful to the target party's position.
4 7
For the target party to shield facts from disclosure, it will
need opportunities to reach witnesses before the opposing party
and to be present during the contact with opposing counsel. After
meeting with a former employee with relevant but harmful knowl-
edge, the target party might attempt to shield that information in
several ways. For example, it might identify in discovery only those
former employees who will be testifying witnesses (omitting
nontestifying persons with disadvantageous information), convince
its opponent that the former employee is not worth pursuing, or
discourage the former employee from cooperating with the op-
posing party."'
146 Such protections may be afforded to attorney work product, expert materials, and
trade secrets. See FED. R. CrV. P. 26(b)(3), (b)(4), and (c)(7).
147 In the case of former employees, this interest sometimes appears as an asserted
interest in preventing the disclosure of privileged information, and can be mingled with
that interest. See Oak Indus. v. Zenith Indus., No. 86-C4302, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1988) (fact that former employee may relate damaging informa-
tion is not sufficient to prevent ex parte contact);' Shealy v. Laidlaw Bros., 34 Fair. Empl.
Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1223, 1225 (D.S.C. 1984) (party has no right to prevent development
of facts adverse to its position); Bobele v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144, 147 (Ct.
App. 1988) (target cannot block ex parte contacts merely because former employee
might disclose unfavorable facts); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569
(Wash. 1984) (protection of prejudicial facts is not a purpose of prohibition of ex parte
contacts); Dent v. Kaufman, 406 S.E.2d 68, 72 (W. Va. 1991) (same). It- is
well-established, however, that facts are never privileged, and so the interest in protecting
privileged information can never be a justification for withholding facts. Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) ("The [attorney-client] privilege only protects
disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying
facts . . ").
148 See Siguel v. Trustees of Tufts College, No. CIV.A.88-0626-4, 1990 WL 29199 (D.
Mass. Mar. 12, 1990) (ex parte contact permitted for current employees because tradi-
tional discovery would be unlikely to result in target party's volunteering the identity of
witnesses with information favorable to contacting party). These actions have different lev-
els of ethical propriety. For example, it is not improper to convince an opponent that all
former employees need not be identified or contacted, so long as the target party's
counsel does not breach its duty of truthfulness in statements to others. See MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1983) ("In the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to
a third person ... ."). The target party's counsel cannot properly suggest, holvever, that
a former employee refuse to talk to an opposing party. The counsel's duty of fairness to
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6. Interest in Burdening the Opponent
The target party will have an interest, albeit potentially illegiti-
mate, in making each step of its opponent's case as expensive and
inconvenient as possible. Although it is unethical under Rule 3.1
of the Model Rules149 and improper under Rules 11 and 26(g)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 to file a pleading or
to conduct discovery solely for the purpose of delay or inconve-
nience, this factor might be taken into account as an incidental
effect'of one's litigation strategies. In the ease of ex parte con-
tacts, the target party can burden its opponent by orchestrating
depositions or interviews at inconvenient times and places, and by
requiring the contacting party to comply with the formalities and
expense of subpoenas and court reporters.
C. Interests of the Former Employee
Although they rarely become significant in the parties' dispute
over ex parte contacts, the former employee usually will have
personal interests affected by such contacts.
the opposing party and counsel under Rule 3.4 of the Model Rules specifically prohibits
it from "request[ing] a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving rele-
vant information to another party." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 3.4
(1983). Although Rule 3.4 exempts current employees from this requirement (and the
target party's counsel therefore can request current employees not to voluntarily cooper-
ate with the contacting party), former employees are not exempted. Thus, it would be
unethical for the target party's counsel to suggest that a former employee refuse to coop-
erate with the contacting party.
149 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 3.1 (1983) ("A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.").
150 FED. R. Crv. P. 11 ("The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by the signer . . . that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."); FED. R.
Civ. P. 26 (g):
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the signer
has read the request, response, or objection, and that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: . . .
(2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case,
the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the im-
portance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
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1. Interest in Avoiding Personal Liability
During any ex parte contact, the former employee will have
an interest in ensuring that whatever he relates to the contacting
party will not expose him to personal liability. In many cases, how-
ever, the former employee will not appreciate the extent to which
he might be personally liable.
A former employee who has relevant, firsthand knowledge
regarding a matter is likely to have played an active role in that
matter. Because the former employee was actively involved in the
matter being litigated, an ex parte contact will focus on actions
taken by the employee but attributable to the employer. The po-
tential for imputed conduct to the employer and consequent em-
ployer liability for the acts of its former employee, however, does
not negate the potential for personal liability of the employee. For
example, if the employer can prove that the employee's actions
were taken outside the scope of his employment, and were not
authorized by the employer, the employer might escape liability.
By the same token, the former employee might be at risk for
personal liability because of his unauthorized actions."'
In any case in which the former employee is potentially liable,
the former employee's interests usually will be adverse to both the
contacting party and the target party. Accordingly, it is unsatisfac-
tory to allow ex parte contacts or to permit the contact to take
place with the target party's counsel present. Instead, the former
employee's interests usually can be accommodated only by requir-
ing that he be given the option of personal representation.'52
151 This could be the case if, for example, the former employee's conduct that re-
sults in a plaintiff's wrongful discharge also is actionable under the forum's defamation
laws. Another example that shows the former employee's interest in nonliability is in the
case of a former employee who, contrary to corporate policy and instructions, directs that
hazardous waste be disposed in an unlawful manner, which later results in clean-up costs
to third parties. The employee will have information relevant to an action brought by an
affected third party for recovery of the costs it had to expend in cleaning up the im-
properly disposed waste. Also, the former employee may face personal civil or criminal
liability.
152 Indeed, under Rule 4.3(b), the contacting party has a duty to inform the former
employee that he should seek counsel. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
4.3 cmt. (1983) ("During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer
should not give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain coun-
sel."); see also Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 88-3 (1988) (if former employee has
personal representation, ex parte contact is not proper); Michigan Comm. on Professional
& Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-597 (1980) (when interests of contacting party and
former employee may be adverse, contacting attorney has obligation to advise former
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2. Interest in Convenience
The former employee will have an interest in minimal disrup-
tion of his personal and business affairs by the litigation. 5 Be-
cause the target party is no longer his employer, the former em-
ployee is likely to have little incentive to spend significant time
participating in the discovery process. The former employee also
has an interest in having the contact occur under circumstances
comfortable and convenient to him. 54
VII. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR Ex PARTE CONTACTS WITH
FORMER EMPLOYEES OF A CORPORATE ADVERSARY
The myriad of competing interests that populate the field of
ex parte contacts are not entitled to the same degree of protec-
tion; some of them are not entitled to any protection. The con-
tacting party's interests in candor and ease of access to informa-
tion appear most worthy of protection. Similarly, the target party's
interests in shielding privileged information from disclosure, learn-
ing the facts, and ensuring the accurate description of events also
employee to seek legal counsel and to adjourn interview until former employee has an
opportunity to do so). If the former employee does obtain counsel, then the contact
becomes a Rule 4.2 question.
In some cases, the target party's counsel will jointly represent the target party and
the former employee. In this way, the target party may seek to advance its own interests
under the guise of protecting the former employee's interests. See In re Coordinated Pre-
trial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982). When there is a possibility that the former employee's inter-
ests will diverge from the target party's, joint representation raises difficult conflict of
interest problems. Id.; State Bar of Wisconsin, Op. E-82-10 (1982) (target party cannot
contact former employee to offer joint representation unless former employee requests
representation, no conflict exists, and target party consents).
153 Several courts have recognized a former eniployee's interest in convenience and
have mandated rules to minimize disruption and the potential for the individual to be
deceived. For example, these courts have required the interviewer to identify himself and
the capacity in which he has been retained, to identify the litigation and the purpose of
the contact, to ask whether the individual is represented by counsel, and to ask permis-
sion to interview the individual about issues relevant to the litigation. See supra note 115
and accompanying text.
154 In Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., C.A. No. 87-2799-T (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 1990),
the court permitted the contacting party to communicate with the targets' former em-
ployees by a prescribed form letter. The form letter, inter alia, advised the former em-
ployees that they could decline to be interviewed by indicating this on a response card
sent to them with a stamped, addressed envelope. For the sole purpose of confirming a
former employee's identity when necessary, the court permitted telephone contacts pursu-
ant to a sharply limited script. Id.
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deserve protection. The contacting party's interest in obtaining
privileged information and the target party's interest in withhold-
ing facts from discovery obviously should be discouraged. At the
same time, the contacting party's interests in surprise and influenc-
ing the facts, and the target party's interests in influencing the
facts and in burdening its opponent should be controlled to en-
sure that these interests are not pursued illegitimately.
A. Proposed Amendment to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure
In order to efficiently accommodate the parties' competing
interests, a discovery rule governing ex parte contacts should, at
minimum: (1) promote efficient access to relevant, accurate infor-
mation; (2) protect against disclosure of privileged communica-
tions; and (3) prevent unfair surprise. i5 No court has attempted
to fashion a rule governing ex parte contacts in all cases. This is
not surprising, for rule-making of this type is a legislative- rather
than judicial function. Accordingly, a new amendment to Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be adopted:
Rule 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY.
(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. Unless otherwise limited
by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope
of discovery is as follows:
(5) FORMER EMPLOYEES. Discovery of information
otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision
(b) (1) of this rule, when sought from a nonparty former em-
ployee of a party, may be obtained only as follows:
(A) Through a deposition conducted pursuant to Rules 30
or 31.
(B) Upon written consent of the former employer of the
person to be contacted, through an interview outside the pres-
ence of counsel for the former employer.
(C) In the absence of written consent of the former em-
ployer of the person to be contacted, through an interview
outside the presence of counsel for the former employer upon
the following conditions:
(i) Written notice of all contacts with a former employee
shall be provided to the former employer within eleven (11)
155 As an ethics rule, Rule 4.2 concerns itself only with item (2)-its effect on items
(I) and (3) has, to date, been only incidental.
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days after any such contact, without the need for a request for
such notice by the former employer. No contact may be made
prior to the expiration of 45 days after service of the com-
plaint.
(ii) The notice shall include the name of the former em-
ployee; his residence address (if known); his telephone number
(if known); the dates and times, including duration, of each
contact; and whether such contact was in person, by telephone,
or otherwise.
(iii) For any contact that results in a discussion of the
subject matter of the pending action, all communications shall
be recorded verbatim by stenographic means or, upon election
of the party conducting the interview, as provided in subdivi-
sion (iv) of this rule.
(iv) An interview required to be recorded under this rule
may be recorded by nonstenographic means that ensure an
accurate and trustworthy verbatim record. Examples of such
means include but are not limited to audio and audio-visual
tape recording. The party conducting the interview shall bear
the risk, including exclusion from evidence at trial of informa-
tion learned or flowing from any such interview, that any
means employed under this subdivision is not accurate and
trustworthy.
(v) The record of any interview required to be recorded
under this rule shall be promptly filed with the court under
seal. The record need not be transcribed unless ordered by the
court.
(vi) Subject to subdivision (b)(3) of this rule (requiring
production of statements to persons making them), the record
of any interview required to be recorded under this rule need
not be produced to any party unless ordered by the court.
B. A Defense of the Proposed Amendment
The proposed rule seeks to achieve the ideal result5 6 by
permitting ex parte contacts with all former employees, so long as
the contacting party both gives notice to the target party of for-
mer employees who have been contacted and preserves the ex
parte communications.
156 As discussed supra Part VIIA., the goals of the rule should be to: (1) promote
efficient access to relevant, accurate information; (2) protect against disclosure of
privileged communications; and (3) prevent unfair surprise.
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1. Notice to the Target Party
The contacting party should inform the target party of the
identity of former employees who have been contacted. This will
maintain the target party's interest in learning the facts by identi-
fying former employees who have information relevant to the
action and who may be witnesses.' A rule not requiring such notice
would unfairly limit the target from knowing what its own former
employees said. Conversely, no legitimate interest would be ad-
vanced by totally shielding this information from disclosure to the
target.1
57
The timing of disclosure is crucial. In order to protect the
contacting party's interests in candor and ease of access to rele-
vant information, the target party should not be given notice of
the contact until after it has occurred. In this way, the danger of
the target party procuring "coached" or uncooperative former
employees will be minimized. To minimize the danger of surprise
to the target party, however, the contacting party must disclose far
enough in advance of trial to permit the target party ample op-
portunity to interview or depose the former employee.
Targets who do not have advance notice might not be able to
fully protect against disclosure of privileged communications. This
Article concludes, however, that the contacting party's interest in
candor and the target's interest in protecting privileged informa-
tion are best accommodated by a general rule that does not re-
quire advance notice. A motion for a protective order at the be-
ginning of the lawsuit is the best means to handle a claim by the
target that it needs advance notice to prevent disclosure of
information.' 8 The corporation likely will know the identity and
157 Shielding this information would, in some cases, forward the contacting party's
interest in surprise. As discussed supra Part VI, however, this interest does not deserve
protection.
158 The proposed rule prohibits interviews until 45 days after the complaint is served
in order to permit the target to move for a protective order. See Polycast Technology
Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 629 (S.D.N.Y.) (stating that employer could seek
a protective order in appropriate cases because "the former employer is well aware of the
existence of the privileged communications"), aflld, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15382 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Bobele v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144 (CL App. 1988) (target party could
seek protective order barring ex parte contacts as to any employee who knows or is privy
to privileged information); Nolen v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 85-C-6778, 1986
WL 13217, at *1 (N.D. II. Nov. 17, 1986) (granting protective order barring ex parte
contacts).
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location of former employees who actually hold privileged informa-
tion.
There are numerous' ways to implement the notice require-
ment. Although the requirement itself is hard to dispute on prin-
cipled grounds, it is easy to envision arguments for and against
specific notice requirements. For example, should the notice in-
clude the date and time of the contact? Should the contacting
party give notice automatically, or only upon written request?
Should the contacting party give notice within a short time after
the contact, or is notice any time during the discovery period
adequate? We have suggested answers to these questions, but real-
ize that reasonable minds may differ.
2. Preservation of the Communications Between the Contacting
Party and the Former Employee
The contacting party should create a record to preserve any
communications with former employees that take place in an ex
parte setting.'5 9 Preservation of the communications simulta-
neously achieves several important ends. First, knowledge that the
communication will be preserved will deter the contacting party
from seeking to coerce or distort the former employee's testimony,
and also from inquiring into potentially'privileged matters. Preser-
vation of the communications also will deter the former employee
from telling a different version of events to the contacting party
and the target party. Moreover, if a dispute about the ex parte
contact later arises, preservation of the communications will pro-
vide the court with a solid basis upon which to rule. 6°
Just as with the notice feature of the rule, there are obviously
many ways to implement the preservation feature. For example,
the rule could require the parties to preserve the communication
verbatim or merely the substance of it. A verbatim record will best
protect the interests involved. This type of record avoids the prob-
lems of having the contacting party make subjective judgments as
to what part of the interview to memorialize. A summary of the
159" But see IBM Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (issuing writ of man-
damus against district court's order that ex parte interviews be transcribed and be made
available to the court).
160 For example, if the target party claims that the contacting party improperly elicit-
ed privileged information from the former employee, the court will have a record upon
which to determine this issue. If the target party's claim is upheld, the court also will
have a basis upon which to determine the *scope of any preclusion or other order.
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substance of the communication potentially would disclose the
contacting party's work product, or provide a means for conceal-
ing improper tactics during the interview. The proposed rule elim-
inates these problems by requiring verbatim transcription while at
the same time proposing limiting factors that avoid saddling the
interview process with unnecessary expense. Filing the record with
the court provides an additional safeguard by maintaining the
integrity of the record.
Finally, under what circumstances should a contacting party
disclose the record to the court or the target party? If a legitimate
dispute arises over either the matters discussed during the contact
or the interviewing techniques employed by the contacting party,
transcription and production of the record might be warranted.
For example, if the disclosure of privileged communications be-
comes an issue, transcription and production of the record would
allow the court (possibly through an in camera inspection) or the
target to address the matter. Beyond this limited scope, however,
production of the record should not be ordered, because the
transcript should not become a substitute for formal discovery by
the target party.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The issue whether counsel can informally contact former
employees of a corporate adversary has spawned a tremendous
amount of litigation nationwide, due in part to a pronounced lack
of uniformity and predictability. The ABA formal opinion provides
a clear answer from the standpoint of legal ethics, but does not
accommodate the deeply held and antagonistic interests from the
standpoint of pretrial discovery. As a result of these interests and
the. absence of any governing standard, this Article predicts that
litigation over this issue will continue unabated.
For the ABA simply to declare the issue not to be a matter of
ethics will not work. The legal profession requires a fresh perspec-
tive. This Article has attempted to provide this perspective by
addressing ex parte contacts as a discovery issue, and by proposing
an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The pro-
posed amendment accounts for the parties' relevant interests and
the best approaches suggested by courts. Most importantly, it pro-
vides a discovery-based approach to a discovery problem.
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